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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays in macroeconomic econometrics. The first
essay investigates industry level production functions. Part of the interest in doing this is
to contribute to the ongoing improvements in dynamic macroeconomic models which are
increasingly disaggregating economies into industrial sectors. This paper provides useful
production function parameter values for this endeavour. In addition, the paper shows that
there are differences across industry level production functions, so model disaggregation
cannot rely on a generic scaled down aggregate production function. Futhermore, evidence
of these differences is provided in several ways. First, it is shown that some, but not all,
industry level production functions exhibit constant returns to scale. Second, conducted
pairwise tests show whether government capital production elasticities are the same for
different pairs of industries. In the majority of these tests, the null hypothesis was rejected.
In the second essay, the relevance of wage rigidities for understanding the effect of oil price
shocks on output and inflation is examined. The theoretical framework of Blanchard and
Gali (2007) is adopted and modified in two important ways. First, an empirically estimated
wage adjustment cost function is incorporated following work by Kim and Ruge-Murcia
(2009). Second, a realistic monetary policy function is incorporated into the model to be
consistent with the current macroeconomic literature. The paper provides evidence that the
degree of wage stickiness has little effect on the oil price-macroeconomy relationship. We
find that the only way to generate large changes in the variances of output and inflation is
to increase the wage adjustment cost by an extreme amount.
The third essay assesses the statistical adequacy of the Cobb-Douglas aggregate produc-
tion function with public capital as an input. The paper tests the statistical adequacy of
the models proposed by Aschauer (1989a) and Tatom (1991) and finds that both models are
misspecified. Furthermore, the paper finds that Tatom’s model suffers from the same criti-
cism he levels against Aschauer’s model, non-stationarity in the data series used to estimate
the model. Using Aschauer’s framework, a properly specified model is found that models
both deterministic heterogeneity and serial autocoreelation. Model results find that public
capital is positive and significant. The results are in contrast to a large body of literature
that discredits Aschauer’s findings claiming his model is incorrect. Finally, an additional
specification of the model using the student’s t linear regression model is explored to capture
potential heteroskedasticity.
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Chapter 1
Government Capital and Production:
Industry Level Estimates
1.1 Introduction
A large body of empirical work has been devoted to estimating the contribution of govern-
ment capital to production.1 Almost all of this work has been carried out on aggregate
production functions. However, questions remain about the local or micro implications of
government capital. Some work has entertained this possibility with investigations of the
regional or state effects of government capital.2,3
There are several reasons that a sectoral estimation can be useful. First, a sectoral
estimation can provide evidence, either for or against, whether using a single aggregate
production function with constant returns to scale to represent all economic sectors, as is so
common in macroeconomic work today, is appropriate.4 Second, should evidence be found
1Some of the earliest work was done by Landau (1983) and Ratner (1983). Interest in this topic increased
when papers by Aschauer (1989a,b) and Munnell (1990); Munnell and Cook (1990) connected public capital
investment to productivity. Numerous studies followed, including Cassou and Ai (1995); Holtz-Eakin (1994);
Lynde and Richmond (1992), and others that sought to improve upon the earlier estimation techniques.
See Romp and de Haan (2007) for a recent survey of the literature.
2See for instance, Costa, Ellson and Martin (1987); Holtz-Eakin (1994); Munnell and Cook (1990) or
Garcia-Mila, McGuire and Porter (1996). Other studies have provided a focus on the manufacturing sector
effects of policy.
3See for instance, Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994) or Mullen and Williams (1990) But so far, nobody has
investigated the effects of government capital on all the different sectors of the economy. This paper takes
up this investigation.
4One of the earliest and best known works to use this style of model is Kydland and Prescott (1982).
More recent work with a public capital feature include Alonso-Carrera and Raurich (2010); Barro (1991);
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that production functions are different, it can provide useful parameter estimates that will
be useful to a variety of deeper economic analysis which need sectoral production function
parameter estimates.
We find that there are significant differences across sectors in their need for government
capital. Surprisingly, the education sector has the lowest public capital elasticity. This
result probably arises because the sector is dominated by education providers (schools),
that make decisions that are likely different than those coming from the optimizing agent
assumption that is behind our estimation approach. For the other sectors, which have
a greater proportion of optimizers, we find public capital estimates ranging from a low of
0.226 for Manufacturing to a high of 0.379 for Finance & Insurance. Interestingly, all but
the Education elasticity are larger than the Aggregate Production elasticity. Furthermore,
in testing pairwise whether two industry have the same public capital elasticity, we almost
always find that the elasticities are different.5 This evidence, shows that assuming a single
aggregate production function is not appropriate.
There are numerous empirical approaches within the empirical literature on how to
estimate the elasticity of government capital. Most rely on single equation methods which
estimate production or cost functions using time series for output, labor and private and
public capital stocks. A number of problems have been pointed out with the different
methods, such as the high degree of multicollinearity or reverse causality. In this paper,
we make use of a GMM method used in Cassou and Ai (1995) which does not suffer from
these problems. This method makes use of several different, jointly estimated equations
that come from basic optimization decisions or other identities from an optimizing agent
model, including the production function and those relating capital stocks and investment
over time.
To present our results in a clear format, the paper has been organized as follows. Section
Cassou and Lansing (1998, 1999); de Hek (2006); Glomm and Ravikumar (1997); Hashimzade and Myles
(2010); Marrero (2008); Turnovsky (1997).
5 Tests of three or higher numbers of industrial sectors having the same elasticities, which are reported
in section 1.6, almost never find that the elasticities are the same value.
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1.2 describes the estimation approach and the testing methodology. The results of the
estimation procedures, along with a discussion of the various testing results are provided in
Section 1.3. Section 1.4 sums up the paper.
1.2 The Empirical Model
The empirical method follows the GMM method used in Cassou and Ai (1995). This ap-
proach augments the production function used in many other studies with several other
equations. Two of these equations are the Euler equations from a dynamic optimization
model and two others are the intertemporal capital good relationships. One of the at-
tractions of this approach is that some of these relationships are able to tightly identify
parameters that appear in several equations. This tight identification of a parameter in one
equation, then allows the other equations to better estimate the remaining parameters and
escape the multicollinearity issue that resulted in such larger public capital estimates in the
early work of Aschauer (1989a,b) and Munnell (1990). Another attraction of this approach
is that there is no casualty issues that can arise in linear models where the right-hand side
variables are interpreted as causing the left-hand side variables.
Since the method was fully described in Cassou and Ai (1995), here we provide only a
brief recap of the approach. The dynamic optimization model is a standard growth model
in which agents choose {ict , nt, dt, kt+1 : 0 ≤ t} to maximize
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
(
1
1 + r
)t
dt
}
(1.1)
subject to
dt = Aµ
t(nt)
α1(kct−1)
α2(kgt−1)
α3(ut)
α4θt − wtnt − ict
and
kct = (1− δc)kct−1 + ict (1.2)
given k0 and the sequence {kgt+1 : 0 ≤ t}, where
(
1
1+r
)
is the discount factor the firm uses
to discount future dividends dt, Aµ
t is the exogenous level of technology at time t, nt is
3
labor input at time t, kct is the corporate capital stock that is decided upon at time t and
is available for production at time t+ 1, kgt is the government capital stock that is decided
upon at time t and is available for production at time t+ 1, ut is the capital utilization rate
at time t, θt is a random shock to production at time t, wt is the wage rate at time t and
ict is the amount invested in corporate capital at time t. The Euler equations from this
optimization problem are
Et
{
α1
yt
wtnt
− 1
}
= 0 (1.3)
and
Et
{(
1
1 + r
)(
α2
yt+1
kct
+ (1− δc)
)
− 1
}
= 0. (1.4)
These equations can be used in a GMM vector of moments.
Following the notation in Cassou and Ai (1995), we define two moments using (1.2) and
a government capital analogue as
M1t+1 =
[
1− kct+1−ict+1
kct
− δc
1− k
g
t+1−igt+1
kgt
− δg
]
, (1.5)
where it is assumed Et{M1t+1} = 0. These two moments are particularly well suited for
identifying δc and δg. Next using (1.3) and (1.4), we define
M2t+1 =
[
α1
yt
wtnt
− 1(
1
1+r
) (
α2
yt+1
kct
+ (1− δc)
)
− 1
]
(1.6)
for our second two moments. The Euler equations imply Et{M2t+1} = 0. These two
moments are particularly well suited for identifying α1 and α2. Finally, we make use of
the production function for the third set of moments. Here we allow the possibility that
the production function variables are not cointegrated, by taking the log difference of the
production function. This is analogous to the single equation approach used in Tatom
(1991). Following notation in Cassou and Ai (1995), we let
Ft+1 = ∆ log(yt+1)− log(µ)− α1∆ log(nt+1)− α2∆ log(kct )− α3∆ log(kgt−1)− α4∆ log(ut),
4
Ht+1 = Ft+1 − ρFt,
and
M3t+1 = Ht+1 × Zt
where
Zt =

1
∆ log(kct )
∆ log(kgt )
∆ log(ut+1)
∆ log(kct−1)
∆ log(kgt−1)
∆ log(ut)

are instruments that are in the information set at time t. Under the assumption that
Et{∆ log(θt+1)− ρ∆ log(θt)} = 0,
it follows that Et{M3t+1} = 0. Because the instruments are in the information set, we will
obtain consistent estimates even when θt is serially correlated and the specification allows
us to test if there is even higher order integration which would occur if ρ = 1.
These moments are next stacked to get Mt+1 = [M1
′
t+1M2
′
t+1M3
′
t+1]
′ and the GMM
objective function is to choose γ = (log(µ), α1, α1, α1, α1, δ
c, δg, ρ)′ so as to minimize
M ′V −1M where M =
1
T
T∑
t=1
Mt,
V is a positive definite weighting matrix and T is the sample size. In our application,
we undertake a two step optimization procedure which results in asymptotically efficient
estimates. This approach begins by using V equal to the identity matrix which results in
consistent estimates of γ. These estimates are then used to construct an optimal weighting
matrix given by
V̂ =
1
T
T∑
t=1
M̂tM̂
′
t ,
5
where M̂t is Mt evaluated at the consistent parameter estimates from the first step. A
consistent estimate of the parameter covariance matrix is given by
Ω = (S˜
′
V̂ −1S˜)−1 where S˜ =
1
T
T∑
t=1
∂M˜t
∂γ
and ∂M˜t
∂γ
is ∂Mt
∂γ
evaluated at the second step parameter estimates.
We also perform a number of different tests on the estimated parameters. For ordinary
t-tests, we use standard formulas. For more sophisticated tests, such as testing for constant
returns to scale, or testing whether government capital parameters in different production
functions are equal, we use the DM test described in Newey and McFadden (1994) on page
2222. The DM test statistic is given by
DMT = −2T [QT (γT )−QT (γ˜T )],
where T is the sample size, γn is the constrained estimator, γ˜n is the unconstrained estimator
and
QT (γn) = −1
2
M ′V̂ −1M.
McFadden and West show that asymptotically this test statistic has a distribution of χ2r
where r is the number of restrictions.
1.3 Estimation Results
The model was estimated in numerous different ways, but to keep the exposition short, we
will present only our final approach and summarize the alternatives in our discussion. All
estimation approaches used a return on investment of r = 4.0, which is a popular rate of
return used in the macroeconomic literature. The first estimation approach imposed no
restrictions on the parameters and was used to test H0 : ρ = 0, H0 : α1 + α2 + α3 = 1,
and both restrictions simultaneously using the DM test. The results of these tests for the
different industries along with the aggregate economy are summarized in Table 1.1 below.
6
The DM test for the test statistics with one restriction have χ2 distributions with one degree
of freedom. These test statistics have critical values of 3.84 at the 95%, 5.02 at the 97.5%
and 6.63 at the 99% confidence levels. The joint test DM statistic has a χ2 distribution
with two degrees of freedom and has critical values at the 5.99 at the 95%, 7.38 at the 97.5
and 9.21 at the 99% levels.
Table 1.1 is organized so that each row provides information on the various tests for
first the aggregate production function in the top row and then the nine industry groups
in the next rows.6 Reading across the columns, the second and third column give results
for H0 : ρ = 0, with the second column giving the test statistic value and the third column
a statement of yes or no as to whether the test statistic is significant at the 95% level.
Columns four and five have a similar format, only here the focus is on H0 : α1 +α2 +α3 = 1
while columns six and seven have the same format with a focus on the joint test.
Focusing on the aggregate production function, we see that none of the restrictions are
rejected at the 95% level. This is consistent with findings in Cassou and Ai (1995). Next,
focusing on the individual industries, we see that the test of H0 : ρ = 0 is mostly insignificant
at the 95% level, but there are a few cases where it is not. However, for these industries,
the test statistic is not greater than 6.63, which is the 99% critical level. Taken as a whole,
these tests indicated that there is little evidence that second differencing is necessary.
Next, focusing on the constant returns to scale test, we see fewer insignificant test statis-
tics at the 95% level. Two of the test statistics that are significant at the 95% level are
not larger than 5.02, which is the 97.5% confidence value, while three of the test statistics
remain significant even at the 99% level. For the joint test, we see that there are four
industries that are significant at the 95% level, but two of the test statistics are somewhat
marginally significant as they do not maintain significance at the 97.5% or 99% level. The
6These include, Manufacturing, Mining, Construction, Transportation & Utilities, Trade, Finance &
Insurance, Education, Healthcare and Lodging. We use ”&” rather than ”and” when it is part of an
industry name.
All industries, except Transportation & Utilities and Lodging, use yearly data from 1948 to 2009. Due
to data limitations, Lodging and Transportation & Utilities use yearly data from 1977 to 2008. A complete
description of the data is contained in section 1.5.
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Table 1.1: Initial Tests
Tests of H0 : ρ = 0, H0 : α1 + α2 + α3 = 1 and
H0 : ρ = 0 and α1 + α2 + α3 = 1
H0 : ρ = 0 H0 : α1 + α2 + α3 = 1 Joint Test
DM Stat Reject DM Stat Reject DM Stat Reject
Aggregate Production 0.037 no 0.373 no 0.386 no
Manufacturing 0.729 no 3.262 no 3.268 no
Mining 0.574 no 1.539 no 1.559 no
Construction 4.444 yes 7.376 yes 8.425 yes
Transport & Utilities 0.092 no 2.560 no 4.314 no
Trade 4.980 yes 9.580 yes 10.894 yes
Finance & Insurance 0.539 no 20.641 yes 25.418 yes
Education 1.758 no 0.279 no 1.761 no
Healthcare 0.063 no 4.400 yes 5.803 no
Lodging (1977-2008) 0.003 no 4.187 yes 6.197 yes
fact that these restrictions do not hold for all industries is our first evidence that there are
differences in the production functions across industries.
Our next investigation into the differences in the industry production functions is to
formally test whether the industries have the same government capital production elasticity.
To do this, we need to construct restricted and unrestricted estimation algorithms that are
nested in such a way that we can compute the DM statistic. This requires that the
individual industry production functions are estimated under the same constraints. Since
the majority of the firms indicated that the constraints were not binding, we will focus on
industry estimates in which both the constraints are imposed.
Table 1.2 presents the production function estimates under the restrictions where ρ = 0
and α1 +α2 +α3 = 1. The aggregate production function shows rather common elasticity
estimates, with the labor elasticity equaling 0.640, the private capital elasticity equaling
0.233 and the government capital elasticity equaling 0.127. Next focusing on the industry
estimates, we see that the elasticities vary considerably. Education has the highest labor
elasticity of 0.866. This seems reasonable, since labor inputs are relatively larger than
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capital inputs in this industry. Next, Manufacturing and Construction come in with labor
elasticities of 0.705 and 0.699. Again these numbers likely reflect the high labor intensity.
At the other extreme are Transportation & Utilities and Mining with considerably smaller
labor elasticities. These likely reflect the rather capital intensive nature of these industries.
Table 1.2 also shows that the private capital elasticities reflect more or less opposite
patterns from the labor elasticities. So Education, Manufacturing and Construction, with
their large labor elasticities show smaller private capital elasticities while Transportation &
Utilities and Mining with their small labor elasticities show larger private capital elasticities.
The government capital elasticities are fairly consistent across industries, with the ex-
ception of Education which has a very low value. Outside of Education these elasticity
estimates range from a low of 0.226 for Manufacturing to a high of 0.379 for Finance &
Insurance. Interestingly, all but the Education elasticity are larger than the Aggregate
Production elasticity.7
7This could arise for a number of reasons. It could be an artifact of the way the industry level data is
collected. Alternatively, it may reflect an economy of scale substitution feature of the Aggregate Production
function that is unavailable to individuals. For instance, individual farmers may be more dependent on
roadway capital for shipping their output than large Agribusiness that can use private railways for shipping.
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Table 1.2: Parameter Estimation (ρ = 0 and α1 + α2 + α3 = 1)
ln(µ) α1 α2 α3 α4 δ
c δg
Aggregate Production 0.017 0.640 0.233 0.127 0.236 0.079 0.017
(1.722) (26.265) (18.702) (1.054) (7.182) (2.283)
Manufacturing 0.01 0.705 0.069 0.226 0.257 0.121 0.028
(0.64) (12.530) (2.462) (0.665) (4.779) (1.283)
Mining 0.011 0.389 0.259 0.351 0.057 0.106 0.028
(0.138) (5.557) (3.252) (0.030) (3.364) (1.129)
Construction 0.009 0.699 0.04 0.261 0.165 0.175 0.027
(0.479) (21.62) (4.224) (0.47) (6.179) (1.091)
Transportation & Utilities 0.002 0.463 0.213 0.324 -0.171 0.091 0.028
(0.098) (18.105) (5.937) (-0.228) (5.610) (2.149)
Trade 0.004 0.640 0.039 0.322 0.382 0.121 0.028
(0.209) (14.107) (2.249) (0.573) (4.858) (1.114)
Finance & Insurance 0.02 0.566 0.056 0.379 0.017 0.144 0.028
(0.767) (23.148) (2.115) (0.332) (5.822) (1.184)
Education 0.016 0.866 0.113 0.021 0.148 0.066 0.027
(0.582) (37.375) (3.297) (0.239) (2.617) (1.088)
Healthcare 0.018 0.581 0.073 0.347 0.257 0.094 0.030
(0.776) (4.30) (4.734) (0.651) (3.724) (1.242)
Lodging (1977-2008) 0.016 0.590 0.102 0.308 0.251 0.062 0.028
(0.683) (17.547) (7.238) (0.35) (3.35) (1.179)
Our next investigation is to formally test whether the public capital elasticity estimates
are the same across industries. There are a number of different ways one can do this. For
example, at one extreme, one could construct a DM test statistic that jointly tests whether
all the industry coefficients are the same simultaneously, or, at the other extreme, one could
construct simple DM test statistics which test only two industries at a time, or one could
construct something in between. We carried out all the variations of these tests, but the
results are strong enough at the two industry level that here we only provide those results.8
Table 1.3 shows the DM test statistics for all of the pairwise industry tests. The table is
constructed so that an entry in a particular row and column shows the DM statistic for the
null hypothesis that the government capital elasticity for the industry in that row is equal
the government capital elasticity for the industry in that column. So in particular, looking
8Results for greater numbers of industries are reported in section 1.6
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Table 1.3: DM test - 2 Sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) Aggregate Production -
(2) Manufacturing 207.00 -
(3) Mining 334.39 88.02 -
(4) Construction 711.91 24.27 50.95 -
(5) Transportation & Utilities 408.74 110.97 0.75 17.75 -
(6) Trade 821.46 122.44 4.74 67.52 9.29 -
(7) Finance & Insurance 1435.67 315.32 3.58 268.22 0.01 45.41 -
(8) Education 249.14 562.15 596.15 1141.97 754.11 1264.81 1845.27 -
(9) Healthcare 88.40 18.36 2.03 7.86 147.97 0.01 6.39 200.14 -
(10) Lodging 493.71 106.51 26.78 8.35 2.44 3.51 3.44 883.79 144.67
down the first (numerical) column to the second row, we find the DM statistic value of
88.02. This DM statistic is computed for the null hypothesis that the government capital
elasticity for Manufacturing is the same as the government capital elasticity for Mining.
Since all of the pairwise tests impose one restriction, they all have a χ2 distribution with
one degree of freedom. These test statistics have critical values of 3.84 at the 95%, 5.02
at the 97.5% and 6.63 at the 99% confidence levels. In the case of the Manufacturing and
Mining test, we see that the value of 88.02 is far above all of the critical values and thus the
null hypothesis is easily rejected.
Now that the structure of Table 1.3 is understood, one can look through the table and
see that the vast majority of the DM statistics are very large, indicating that the public
capital elasticities are quite different across the industries. There are only six DM statistics
that are insignificant at the 95% level, and another one at the 99% level. These statistics
provide strong evidence that the contribution of government capital to industry production
is considerably different across industries. Furthermore, these pairwise tests are sufficient to
recognize what would happen if greater numbers of industries where tested simultaneously.
In those tests, which are reported in the section 1.6, the DM statistics are almost always
significant indicating that the industry level elasticities are different.
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1.4 Conclusion
This paper investigated industry level production functions. Part of the interest in doing
this is to contribute to the ongoing improvements in dynamic macroeconomic models which
are increasingly disaggregating the economies into industrial sectors. This essay provides
useful production function parameter values for that endeavour.
Second we show that there are differences across industry level production functions, so
model disaggregation cannot rely on a generic scaled down aggregate production function.
We have shown evidence of these differences in several ways. First, we showed that some,
but not all, industry level production functions exhibit constant returns to scale. Second,
we conducted pairwise tests as to whether the government capital production elasticity was
the same for a pair of industries. In the majority of these tests, this null hypothesis was
easily rejected.
1.5 Data Sources
Table 1.4: Output
Industry Dates Source
(1) Private Industries 1948-2009 BEA: Value Added by Industry (Release Date - Sep 30, 2010)
(2) Manufacturing 1948-2009 BEA: Value Added by Industry (Release Date - Sep 30, 2010)
(3) Mining 1948-2009 BEA: Value Added by Industry (Release Date - Sep 30, 2010)
(4) Construction 1948-2009 BEA: Value Added by Industry (Release Date - Sep 30, 2010)
(5) Transportation & Utilities1 1977-2008 BEA: Value Added by Industry (Release Date - Sep 30, 2010)
(6) Trade2 1948-2009 BEA: Value Added by Industry (Release Date - Sep 30, 2010)
(7) Finance & Insurance 1948-2009 BEA: Value Added by Industry (Release Date - Sep 30, 2010)
(8) Education 1948-2009 BEA: Value Added by Industry (Release Date - Sep 30, 2010)
(9) Healthcare 1948-2009 BEA: Value Added by Industry (Release Date - Sep 30, 2010)
(10) Lodging/Accommodation 1977-2008 BEA: Value Added by Industry (Release Date - Sep 30, 2010)
1Series was obtained by adding four subseries: transportation & warehousing, waste management,
broadcasting & telecommunications and utilities
2Series was obtained by adding two subseries: wholesale trade and retail trade
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Table 1.5: Private Sector Capital
Industry Dates Source
Private Industries 1948-2009 BEA: Fixed Assets Tables: Table 3.3ES: Stock of Private Fixed Assets by Industry
Manufacturing 1948-2009 BEA: Fixed Assets Tables: Table 3.3ES: Stock of Private Fixed Assets by Industry
Mining 1948-2009 BEA: Fixed Assets Tables: Table 3.3ES: Stock of Private Fixed Assets by Industry
Construction 1948-2009 BEA: Fixed Assets Tables: Table 3.3ES: Stock of Private Fixed Assets by Industry
Transportation & Utilities1 1977-2009 BEA: Fixed Assets Tables: Table 3.3ES: Stock of Private Fixed Assets by Industry
Trade2 1948-2009 BEA: Fixed Assets Tables: Table 3.3ES: Stock of Private Fixed Assets by Industry
Finance & Insurance 1948-2009 BEA: Fixed Assets Tables: Table 3.3ES: Stock of Private Fixed Assets by Industry
Education 1948-2009 BEA: Fixed Assets Tables: Table 3.3ES: Stock of Private Fixed Assets by Industry
Healthcare 1948-2009 BEA: Fixed Assets Tables: Table 3.3ES: Stock of Private Fixed Assets by Industry
Lodging/Accommodation 1948-2009 BEA: Fixed Assets Tables: Table 3.3ES: Stock of Private Fixed Assets by Industry
Table 1.6: Private Sector Investment
Industry Dates Source
Private Industries 1948-2009 BEA: Fixed Assets Tables: Table 3.7ES: Investment in Private Fixed Assets by Industry
Manufacturing 1948-2009 BEA: Fixed Assets Tables: Table 3.7ES: Investment in Private Fixed Assets by Industry
Mining 1948-2009 BEA: Fixed Assets Tables: Table 3.7ES: Investment in Private Fixed Assets by Industry
Construction 1948-2009 BEA: Fixed Assets Tables: Table 3.7ES: Investment in Private Fixed Assets by Industry
Transportation & Utilities1 1977-2009 BEA: Fixed Assets Tables: Table 3.7ES. Investment in Private Fixed Assets by Industry
Trade2 1948-2009 BEA: Fixed Assets Tables: Table 3.7ES: Investment in Private Fixed Assets by Industry
Finance & Insurance 1948-2009 BEA: Fixed Assets Tables: Table 3.7ES: Investment in Private Fixed Assets by Industry
Education 1948-2009 BEA: Fixed Assets Tables: Table 3.7ES: Investment in Private Fixed Assets by Industry
Healthcare 1948-2009 BEA: Fixed Assets Tables: Table 3.7ES: Investment in Private Fixed Assets by Industry
Lodging/Accommodation 1948-2009 BEA: Fixed Assets Tables: Table 3:7ES. Investment in Private Fixed Assets by Industry
Table 1.7: Hours
Industry Dates Source
(1) Private Industries 1948-2009 NIPA: GDP: Table 6.9: Hours Worked by FT and PT Employees by Industry
(2) Manufacturing 1948-2009 NIPA: GDP: Table 6.9: Hours Worked by FT and PT Employees by Industry
(3) Mining 1948-2009 NIPA: GDP: Table 6.9: Hours Worked by FT and PT Employees by Industry
(4) Construction 1948-2009 NIPA: GDP: Table 6.9: Hours Worked by FT and PT Employees by Industry
(5) Transportation & Utilities 1977-2009 NIPA: GDP: Table 6.9: Hours Worked by FT and PT Employees by Industry
(6) Trade3 1948-2009 NIPA: GDP: Table 6.9: Hours Worked by FT and PT Employees by Industry
(7) Finance & Insurance4 1948-2009 NIPA: GDP: Table 6.5: Full-Time Equivalent Employees by Industry
(8) Education4 1948-2009 NIPA: GDP: Table 6.5: Full-Time Equivalent Employees by Industry
(9) Healthcare4 1948-2009 NIPA: GDP: Table 6.5: Full-Time Equivalent Employees by Industry
(10) Lodging/Accommodation4 1948-2009 NIPA: GDP: Table 6.5: Full-Time Equivalent Employees by Industry
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Table 1.8: Wages
Industry Dates Source
Private Industries 1948-2009 NIPA: GDP: Table 6.2 - Compensation of Employees by Industry
Manufacturing 1948-2009 NIPA: GDP: Table 6.2 - Compensation of Employees by Industry
Mining 1948-2009 NIPA: GDP: Table 6.2: Compensation of Employees by Industry
Construction 1948-2009 NIPA: GDP: Table 6.2: Compensation of Employees by Industry
Transportation & Utilities 1977-2009 NIPA: GDP: Table 6.2: Compensation of Employees by Industry
Trade3 1948-2009 NIPA: GDP: Table 6.2: Compensation of Employees by Industry
Finance & Insurance 1948-2009 NIPA: GDP: Table 6.2: Compensation of Employees by Industry
Education 1948-2009 NIPA: GDP: Table 6.2: Compensation of Employees by Industry
Healthcare 1948-2009 NIPA: GDP: Table 6.2: Compensation of Employees by Industry
Lodging/Accommodation 1948-2009 NIPA: GDP: Table 6.2: Compensation of Employees by Industry
Table 1.9: Government Capital, Investment and Industry Utilization Rates
Series Dates Source
Government Capital Stock5 1948 - 2009 BEA: Fixed Assets Tables: Table 7.2 :
Chain-Type Quantity Indexes for Net Stock of Government Fixed Assets
Government Capital Investment5 1948 - 2009 BEA: Fixed Assets Tables: Table 7.6 :
Chain-Type Quantity Indexes for Investment in Government Fixed Assets
Utilization Rate 1948 - 2009 Board of Governors: Table G.17: Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization
1.6 Other elasticity tests
In this section we show the results of the DM tests for larger numbers of government capital
elasticities being equal than those given in Table 1.3. In particular, Table 1.10 shows the
DM test statistics for the null that three industries have the same elasticity, Table 1.11
shows the DM test statistics for the null that four industries have the same elasticity, Table
1.12 ...
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Table 1.10: DM test - 3 Sectors (critical value = 5.99)
(1) & (2) (1) & (3) (1) & (4) (1) & (5) (1) & (6) (1) & (7) (1) & (8) (1) & (9)
(1) Aggregate Production -
(2) Manufacturing - -
(3) Mining 449.52 - -
(4) Construction 720.10 865.30 - -
(5) Transportation & Utilities 416.39 434.36 784.06 - -
(6) Trade 857.04 1003.86 1136.58 536.10 - -
(7) Finance & Insurance 1442.83 1584.41 1641.48 786.25 1815.53 - -
(8) Education 568.97 651.15 1324.59 767.19 1334.99 2080.45 - -
(9) Healthcare 254.00 385.17 723.27 409.44 847.56 1453.69 364.16 -
(10) Lodging 494.38 512.42 788.96 682.87 587.14 805.07 950.27 500.06
Table 1.11: DM test - 4 Sectors (critical value = 7.81)
(1)&(2)&(3) (1)&(2)&(4) (1)&(2)&(5) (1)&(2)&(6) (1)&(2)&(7) (1)&(2)&(8) (1)&(2)&(9)
(1) Aggregate Production -
(2) Manufacturing - -
(3) Mining - - -
(4) Construction 893.87 - - -
(5) Transportation & Utilities 438.63 810.32 - - -
(6) Trade 1044.68 1147.81 536.21 - - -
(7) Finance & Insurance 1601.99 1644.66 794.66 1819.10 - - -
(8) Education 905.01 1428.41 826.48 1483.40 2183.92 - -
(9) Healthcare 508.95 759.92 418.26 901.23 1478.51 658.23 -
(10) Lodging 513.91 819.04 686.48 588.29 818.86 981.74 501.82
Table 1.12: DM test - 5 Sectors (critical value = 9.49)
(1) & (2) &
(3) & (4)
(1) & (2) &
(3) & (5)
(1) & (2) &
(3) & (6)
(1) & (2) &
(3) & (7)
(1) & (2) &
(3) & (8)
(1) & (2) &
(3) & (9)
(1) Aggregate Production -
(2) Manufacturing - -
(3) Mining - - -
(4) Construction - - - -
(5) Transportation & Utilities 815.24 - - - -
(6) Trade 1287.25 553.12 - - - -
(7) Finance & Insurance 1767.06 805.41 1941.42 - - -
(8) Education 1565.36 866.46 1736.65 2408.05 - -
(9) Healthcare 930.24 441.59 1084.22 1634.06 985.53 -
(10) Lodging 823.03 697.37 602.72 827.42 1014.18 521.29
15
Table 1.13: DM test - 6 Sectors (critical value = 11.1)
(1) & (2) & (3)
(4) & (5)
(1) & (2) & (3)
(4) & (6)
(1) & (2) & (3)
(4) & (7)
(1) & (2) & (3)
(4) & (8)
(1) & (2) & (3)
(4) & (9)
(1) Aggregate Production -
(2) Manufacturing - -
(3) Mining - - -
(4) Construction - - - -
(5) Transportation & Utilities - - - - -
(6) Trade 841.19 - - - -
(7) Finance & Insurance 972.85 2137.54 - - -
(8) Education 1645.52 2244.33 2805.03 - -
(9) Healthcare 869.05 1403.56 1882.10 1728.21 -
(10) Lodging 905.55 846.31 972.31 1679.15 880.31
Table 1.14: DM test - 7 Sectors (critical value = 12.6)
(1) & (2) & (3)
(4) & (5) & (6)
(1) & (2) & (3)
(4) & (5) & (6)
(1) & (2) & (3)
(4) & (5) & (6)
(1) & (2) & (3)
(4) & (5) & (6)
(1) Aggregate Production -
(2) Manufacturing - -
(3) Mining - - -
(4) Construction - - - -
(5) Transportation & Utilities - - - -
(6) Trade - - - -
(7) Finance & Insurance 986.95 - - -
(8) Education 1705.60 1909.32 - -
(9) Healthcare 902.23 1047.18 1670.02 -
(10) Lodging 922.58 1033.94 1814.70 974.04
Table 1.15: DM test - 8 Sectors (critical value = 14.1)
(1) & (2) & (3) & (4)
(5) & (6) & (7)
(1) & (2) & (3) & (4)
(5) & (6) & (7)
(1) & (2) & (3) & (4)
(5) & (6) & (7)
(1) Aggregate Production -
(2) Manufacturing - -
(3) Mining - - -
(4) Construction - - -
(5) Transportation & Utilities - - -
(6) Trade - - -
(7) Finance & Insurance - - -
(8) Education 1948.95 - -
(9) Healthcare 1064.82 1735.60 -
(10) Lodging 1043.33 1857.61 997.26
16
Table 1.16: DM test - 9 Sectors (critical value = 15.5)
(1) & (2) & (3) & (4)
(5) & (6) & (7) & (8)
(1) & (2) & (3) & (4)
(5) & (6) & (7) & (9)
(1) Aggregate Production -
(2) Manufacturing - -
(3) Mining - -
(4) Construction - -
(5) Transportation & Utilities - -
(6) Trade - -
(7) Finance & Insurance - -
(8) Education - -
(9) Healthcare 1995.12 -
(10) Lodging 2060.42 1132.25
Table 1.17: DM test - 10 Sectors (critical value = 16.9)
(1) & (2) & (3) & (4)
(5) & (6) & (7) & (8) & (9)
(1) Aggregate Production -
(2) Manufacturing -
(3) Mining -
(4) Construction -
(5) Transportation & Utilities -
(6) Trade -
(7) Finance & Insurance -
(8) Education -
(9) Healthcare -
(10) Lodging 1610.56
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Chapter 2
Do Sticky Wages Affect the Oil
Price-Macroeconomy Relationship?
2.1 Introduction
A large literature has attempted to understand the effects of an oil shock on the econ-
omy (Ferderer, 1996; Hamilton, 1983, 1996; Kilian and Vigfusson, 2011; Lee, Ni and Ratti,
1995). Several mechanisms have been proposed to explain the transmission of oil shocks to
the macroeconomy. One mechanism views an increase in the price of oil as a supply shock
that raises the marginal cost of production (Blanchard and Gali, 2007). The higher oil price
leads to higher inflation and less demand for output. Lee, Ni and Ratti (1995), and Ferderer
(1996) have argued that the uncertainty caused by big fluctuations in the price of oil is more
important than the change in the price of oil. Firms have an incentive to postpone invest-
ment and consumers have an incentive to postpone purchases of vehicles during periods of
high oil price volatility. Hamilton (1988) demonstrated that changes in the price of oil in
either direction can be recessionary. A decrease in the price of oil will cause unemployment
of workers in the oil sector, but those workers cannot immediately move to non-oil sectors,
so the overall unemployment rate rises. Oil shocks can also affect the economy indirectly
if the central bank changes its monetary policy instrument in response to oil price changes
(Bernanke, Gertler and Watson, 1997, 2004; Hamilton and Herrera, 2004; Leduc and Sill,
2004).
18
Blanchard and Gali (2007, hereafter BG) have emphasized the importance of wage rigidi-
ties for the transmission of oil shocks to the economy. They showed that the response of
output and inflation to a change in the price of oil will be much greater in the presence of
wage rigidities than they are in a flexible wage (no wage rigidity) equilibrium. This impor-
tant result suggests that one cannot hope to have a good understanding of the effects of
oil shocks without understanding how wages are determined. One limitation of their work
was that wage rigidities were introduced in an ad hoc fashion. This essay builds on their
work by deriving wage rigidities in a microfounded model that uses parameters taken from
published papers.
BG imposed wage rigidities by adding to their model a parameter, γ, that they describe
as “an index of the degree of real wage rigidities”. To interpret the parameter γ, let rwt
be the deviation from the steady state of the observed real wage at time t and r˜wt be the
deviation from the steady state of the real wage at time t in the absence of wage rigidities,
with the relationship rwt = (1− γ) r˜wt. As γ → 0, there are no wage rigidities, but
as γ → 1, the wage does not respond to shocks to the economy. They explain, “While
clearly ad-hoc, equation (3) is meant to capture in a parsimonious way the notion that real
wages may not respond to labor market conditions as much as implied by the model with
perfectly competitive markets.” While this specification of wage rigidities suffices for their
goal of demonstrating that labor market frictions can affect the oil price-macroeconomy
relationship, it leaves unanswered the question of how important labor market frictions
actually are for the US economy. Bachmeier and Cha (2011) found no evidence that the
labor market plays a role in the response of inflation to oil shocks.
This chapter solves the model of BG with two important modifications. First, we add a
wage adjustment cost function as in Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009). Doing so allows us to
solve for the equilibrium values of output and inflation in terms of the parameters of the
wage adjustment cost function. We then plug in the estimates of the wage adjustment cost
function parameters reported by Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009). Simulations along the lines
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of BG are used to compute the effect of wage stickiness on the responses of output and
inflation to oil shocks. Second, we impose a monetary policy rule that is consistent with the
published literature. Monetary policy in BG responds only to the contemporaneous value
of inflation. The monetary policy rule in our model sets the interest rate as a function of
expected output and inflation, incorporates interest rate smoothing, and uses the coefficients
estimated by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000). The transmission of oil shocks to the economy
was shown by BG to be sensitive to the monetary policy rule, so it is desirable to work with
a monetary policy rule that is consistent with the practice of the Federal Reserve.
There are (at least) two potential criticisms of our choice of theoretical framework. The
first is that we are evaluating the ability of only one type of model with wage rigidities to
affect the oil price-macroeconomy relationship. As noted by Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009),
there are two approaches to adding wage rigidities to macroeconomic models, with one being
the wage adjustment cost as in this chapter, and the other a Calvo-style staggering of wage
decisions. There are good reasons to prefer the former approach. Calvo-style staggered
wage setting implies symmetry in wage stickiness - there is the same resistance to a wage
increase as there is to a wage decrease of the same magnitude. It is not clear why wage
stickiness should be symmetric. Economic principles tell us that workers will be upset
with nominal wage reductions but happy with nominal wage increases, and there is strong
empirical evidence in favor of asymmetric wage stickiness (Kim and Ruge-Murcia, 2009).
A Calvo mechanism would have to be supplemented with some other source of asymmetry.
In addition, we are able to pull estimates of the parameters of the wage adjustment cost
function from the literature, but are not aware of a published paper with estimates of the
parameters of Calvo-style staggered wage setting in a DSGE setting.1
1Obviously, there are other ways to estimate those parameters. A simple approach, given the proper
dataset, would just be to use the average amount of time between wage negotiations to infer the probability a
worker’s wage changes in each time period. This simple approach could lead to misleading results, however,
because it would only capture those cases in which the wage changed, ignoring times that the wage could
have changed but did not. A time period with large oil shocks would cause wages to change more often
than normal. Note that this is not an argument that the parameters of the Calvo model are time-varying.
Even if the probability δ that a worker’s wage will change is constant, looking at the duration between
wage changes will not properly capture this, because it excludes all of the times that it was optimal to leave
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The second criticism is that we are studying a log-linearized solution of our model.
Given the asymmetry in the wage adjustment cost function, it is perhaps more natural to
take a higher-order approximation around the steady state. That was the approach taken
by Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009). Higher-order approximations of DSGE models are now
routinely used in published papers (Faia and Monacelli, 2007; Gomme and Klein, 2011). The
default solution algorithm for the Dynare (Adjemian et al., 2012) program for solution of
rational expectations models is to take a second-order approximation as in Sims (2002). BG
analyzed a log-linearized model, and our goal is to see if the effect of wage rigidities on the
oil price-macroeconomy relationship that they found is consistent with empirical estimates
of wage adjustment costs, so an apples-to-apples comparison can only be done if we use a
log-linearized model.
We believe that there is merit to both criticisms. However, both of those extensions
to our model, while important and interesting, are beyond the scope of this chapter. We
believe they would be fruitful topics for future research.
The essay is structured in the following order. Section 2.2 describes the theoretical model,
log-linearization around the steady state, and solution using the generalized Schur method.
Section 2.3 explains the choice of parameters and compares the results of simulations from
our model to those in BG. Section 2.4 demonstrates the magnitude of the change in wage
adjustment costs that would be necessary to generate large changes in the effects of oil
shocks. Section 2.5 is the conclusion.
2.2 The Model
The model is a modified version of Blanchard and Gali (2007). The two important differ-
ences, discussed in detail below, are the presence of wage adjustment costs, and a more
realistic monetary policy rule. Throughout this section, upper case variables with time sub-
the wage unchanged. One reason that wages might not change would be a fixed cost associated with the
negotiation. If the data come from a low inflation time period, as is the case for the US over the last two
decades, it is possible that it was optimal to not change the wage in most cases when they could have done
so. That would lead to a large upward bias in the estimate of δ.
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script denote levels, while lower case variables with time subscripts are percentage deviations
their steady state values.
2.2.1 Households
The economy consists of a continuum of infinitely lived households. Following Kim and
Ruge-Murcia (2009), households are assumed to have differentiated job skills, but are oth-
erwise identical, giving them monopolistic bargaining power over their labor supply. Each
household maximizes
max E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ln (Ct)− N
1+φ
t
1 + φ
)
subject to the constraints
(i) Pq,tCq,t + Pm,tCm,t +Q
B
t = WtNt (1− Φt) +Bt−1 + Πt (2.1)
(ii) Φt =
(
δ
ψ2
)[
e
−ψ
(
σWt
Wt−1−1
)
+ ψ
(
Wt
Wt−1
− 1
)
− 1
]
(2.2)
(iii) Ct = ΘχC
χ
m,tC
1−χ
q,t (2.3)
(iv) Cq,t =
[∫ 1
0
Cq,t(i)di
−1

] 
−1
(2.4)
(v) Θχ = χ
−χ(1− χ)−(1−χ) (2.5)
(vi) Pq,t =
[∫ 1
0
Pq,t(i)di
1−
] 1
1−
(2.6)
(vii) Pc,t = P
χ
m,tP
1−χ
q,t (2.7)
where Ct is consumption; Nt is employment; Cq,t is a constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) index of domestic goods; Cm,t is consumption of (imported) oil; χ is the share of oil
in consumption; Pq,t is a price index of domestically produced goods; Pm,t is the price of oil
(in domestic currency); Bt is the quantity of risk-free domestic bonds purchased in period
t; QBt is the price of that bond; Wt is the nominal wage.
While the household’s problem here is similar to that in BG, there is an important
difference with respect to wage setting, as can be seen in equations (2.1) and (2.2). Following
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Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009), households face a cost when wages are changed (Φt), where
σ, δ and ψ are cost parameters that determine the shape of the adjustment cost function.
Households choose the wage and labor supply accounting for firms’ demand for labor.
The function in equation (2.2) was called a linex function by Varian (1974). The advan-
tage of the linex function is that it is extremely flexible. Several special cases illustrate the
flexibility of the wage adjustment cost function. As ψ → 0, Φt becomes a quadratic function
in Wt/Wt−1. The shape of Φt implies that a wage decrease is more costly to households than
a wage increase of the same magnitude when ψ > 0. As ψ →∞, the cost of a wage decrease
goes to infinity, while the cost of a wage increase goes to zero, which would be a case of fully
flexible wages subject to the constraint that wages cannot fall. As δ → 0, there is no wage
adjustment cost, and wages are fully flexible in either direction. As δ → ∞, wages do not
change in either direction in response to shocks. These special cases demonstrate the ability
of the choice of Φ to capture many types of symmetric or asymmetric wage stickiness.
First order conditions for households
The household’s optimization problem is solved by substituting equations (2.2)-(2.7) into
the budget constraint (2.1), setting up the Lagrangian, and taking derivatives. The first
order conditions are:
∂L
∂Nt
: Nφt = λtWt (1− Φt) (2.8)
∂L
∂Cq,t
: (1− χ) = λtPq,tCq,t (2.9)
∂L
∂Cm,t
: χ = λtPm,tCm,t (2.10)
∂L
∂Bt
: QBt = β
(
λt+1
λt
)
(2.11)
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∂L
∂Wt
: λtNt
{[
σψ
(
Wt
Wt−1
)
− 1
]
e
−ψ
(
σWt
Wt−1−1
)
− 2ψ
(
Wt
Wt−1
)
+ ψ
(
1 +
ψ
δ
)
+ 1
}
=
= βλt+1Nt+1
(
ψ
W 2t
){
σe
−ψ
(
σWt
Wt−1−1
)
− 1
}
(2.12)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier. The equilibrium behavior of households is summarized
by the following three equations. The first is an intertemporal condition on consumption
ct = Etct+1 − (it − Etpic,t+1) (2.13)
where it is the nominal interest rate, and pic,t = pc,t−pc,t−1 is CPI inflation. Equation (2.13)
corresponds to equation (A.13) in the appendix.
The second equation describes the labor supply
[
1 +
ϕΦ
1− Φ
]
wt = pc,t + ct + φnt +
(
ϕΦ
1− Φ
)
wt−1 (2.14)
with
ϕ =
ψ
[
σe−ψ(σ−1) − 1]
[e−ψ(σ−1) − 1]
and
Φ =
(
δ
ψ2
)[
e−ψ(σ−1) − 1] ,
where wt is the nominal wage and φ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Equation (2.14) corresponds to equation (A.12) in the appendix.
The third equation is a log-linearized version of household’s first order condition with
respect to the nominal wage (Wt)
(Etpc,t−1 − pc,t) + (ct+1 − ct)− (Etnt+1 − nt) + (ϕ1wt + ϕ2wt−1 + ϕ3Etwt+1) = 0. (2.15)
Households will choose a value for the wage such that equation (2.15) holds.
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Oil and Consumption
The price of oil affects households because oil is a consumption good. Total consumption is
given by
ct = (1− χ) cq,t + χcm,t (2.16)
where ct is total consumption; cq,t is the consumption of domestically produced goods (gross
output); and cm,t is the consumption of imported oil. Equation (2.16) is the log-linearized
version of the third constraint in the household’s optimization setup.
Let pq,t and pc,t be the prices of domestic output and consumption respectively. Let pm,t
be the price of oil, and [st = pm,t − pq,t] be the real price of oil. The relation between the
domestic output price and the consumption price is given by
pc,t = pq,t + χpq,t (2.17)
One can see that an increase in the real price of oil will increase consumption price relative to
the domestic output price. Equation (2.17) corresponds to equation (A.10) in the appendix.
2.2.2 Firms
Intermediate goods firm
Each firm produces a differentiated good indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] using the following production
function
Qt(i) = AtMt(i)
αmNt(i)
αn (2.18)
where Mt and Nt are the quantities of imported oil and labor used in production. Using the
assumption that firms take input prices as given, the firm’s problem becomes:
min WtNt(i) + Pm,tMt(i) + λ
f
t [AtMt(i)
αmNt(i)
αn −Qt(i)] .
Firms minimize cost, captured by the two terms on the left, taking the production function
as a constraint.
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First order conditions for intermediate goods firms
Taking derivatives of the objective function, we obtain the following equations
∂L
∂Nt(i)
: Wt = λ
f
t (αn)
[
Qt(i)
Nt(i)
]
(2.19)
∂L
∂Mt(i)
: Pm,t = λ
f
t (αm)
[
Qt(i)
Mt(i)
]
(2.20)
∂L
∂λft
: Qt(i) = AtMt(i)
αmNt(i)
αn (2.21)
where λft can be interpreted as marginal cost. Let Ψt denote marginal cost. From equations
(2.19) and (2.20)
Ψt(i) =
Wt
αn
[
Qt(i)
Nt(i)
] = Pm,t
αm
[
Qt(i)
Mt(i)
] (2.22)
Letting
[
Mpt (i) =
Pq,t(i)
Ψt(i)
]
denote a gross markup by firm i, we have
MPt (i)× St ×Mt(i) = αmQt(i)
[
Pq,t(i)
Pq,t
]
, (2.23)
where St =
Pm,t
Pq,t
is the real price of oil. Equation (2.23) corresponds to equation (A.19) in
the appendix.
Final goods firms
Let aggregate gross output be given by the formula
Qt =
[∫ 1
0
Qt(i)
1− 1
 di
] 
−1
(2.24)
The final goods firms then solve
max
Qt(i)
Pq,tQt −
∫ 1
0
Pq,t(j)Qt(j)dj
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Plugging (2.24) into the objective function, the final goods firms solve
max Pq,t
[∫ 1
0
Qt(i)
1− 1
 di
] 
−1
−
∫ 1
0
Pq,t(j)Qt(j)dj (2.25)
First order conditions for final goods firms
Taking derivatives of the objective function, we get
Qt(i) =
(
Pq,t(i)
Pq,t
)−
(2.26)
Plugging (2.26) into (2.23),
[∫ 1
0
Mt(i)di
] [∫ 1
0
Mpt (j)dj
]
=
αmQt
St
Letting Mt =
[∫ 1
0
Mt(i)di
]
and Mpt =
[∫ 1
0
Mpt (j)dj
]
, we can re-write the above equation as
Mt =
αmQt
StM
p
t
(2.27)
Log-linearizing equation (2.27) gives us the demand for oil as an input in production.
mt = −µpt − st + qt (2.28)
where µpt is the price markup, st is the real price of oil, and qt is domestic output. The
demand for oil is negatively correlated with its price and positively correlated with output.
It is negatively correlated with the markup because a higher markup requires that firms
reduce output.
Log-linearizing equation (2.24) around the steady state, we get
qt = at + αmmt + αnnt (2.29)
Plugging (2.28) into (2.29), we obtain the reduced form production function
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qt =
(
1
1− αm
)
[at + αnnt − αmµpt − αmst] (2.30)
where qt is the gross domestic output; at is the level of technology (exogenously given); nt
is hours worked; mt is the quantity of oil used in production; st is the real price of oil; and
αn + αm ≤ 1.
Combining the cost minimization conditions for oil and labor with the aggregate pro-
duction function, we obtain the factor price frontier2
(1− αm) (wt − pc,t) + [αm + (1− αm)χ] st + (1− αn − αm)nt − at + µpt = 0. (2.31)
Staying on the factor price frontier requires that an increase in the real price of oil is
accompanied by at least one of lower real wages, lower employment, or lower markup.
Calvo Price Setting
Firms set prices in a staggered fashion. Calvo’s specification assumes that firms changes
their prices infrequently. Each period there is a probability (1− θ) that a firm can adjust
its price. Thus price adjustments occur randomly. For derivation of Calvo’s model, please
refer to Walsh (2003), pp. 225 - 228.
The optimal rule for price setting is
Et
{
k∞∑
k=0
θkΛt,t+kQt,t+k|t
[
P ∗t −MPΨt+k|t
]}
= 0 (2.32)
where P ∗t is the new price set at time t, Qt,t+k is the level of output in period (t + k) for a
firm that last set price in period t, Ψt+k|t is the marginal cost in period (t + k) for a firm
that last set price in period t, and Mp = 
−1 is the desired gross markup in the steady state.
Domestic price evolution is given by
Pq,t =
[
θ(Pq,t−1)1− + (1− θ) (P ∗t )1−
] 1
1− (2.33)
Log-linearizing (2.32) and (2.33) and rearranging terms
2We have adopted the terminology in Blanchard and Gali (2007).
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piq,t = βEt {piq,t+1} − λp µpt (2.34)
where λp =
[
(1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ
] [
αm+αn
1+(1−αm−αn)(−1)
]
; piq,t = pq,t − pq,t−1; β is the discount factor; θ is
the fraction of firms that leave prices unchanged each time period, and  is the elasticity of
substitution between domestic goods in consumption.
2.2.3 Equilibrium
Combining equations (2.14) and (2.31), we get
ct = qt − χst + ηµpt (2.35)
where
η =
αm
Mp − αm
and Mp is the steady state gross markup. Combining equation (2.35) with the reduced form
production function (2.30) gives consumption as a function of productivity, employment, the
real price of oil, and the markup
ct =
(
1
1− αm
)
[at + αnnt]−
(
αm
1− αm + χ
)
st +
(
η − αm
1− αm
)
µpt . (2.36)
Combining equations (2.36) and (2.14) with the factor price frontier, we obtain an expression
for the markup
Γnnt − Γw (wt − wt−1) = µpt (2.37)
where Γn =
(1−αm)(1+φ)
1+αm−η(1−αm) and Γw =
(1−αm)[ ϕΦ1−Φ ]
1+αm−η(1−αm) . Finally, replacing the expression for the
markup in equation (2.34) with equation (2.37) gives an expression for domestic inflation
piq,t = βEtpiq,t+1 − λpΓnnt + λpΓw (wt − wt−1) . (2.38)
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2.2.4 Value Added and GDP Deflators
The value added deflator is given by
py,t = pq,t −
(
αm
1− αm
)
st, (2.39)
implying that the real price of oil has a negative effect on output, holding the domestic
output price constant. Combining the definition of value added with the demand for oil, we
come up with the following relationship between value added and output
yt = qt +
(
αm
1− αm
)
st + ηµ
p
t . (2.40)
The relationship between consumption and value added is given by
yt = ct +
(
αm
1− αm + χ
)
st (2.41)
which implies that an increase in the real price of oil reduces consumption, holding value
added constant. Finally, the relationship between value added and employment is described
by
yt =
(
1
1− αm
)
[at + αnnt] (2.42)
The relation between value added and employment is independent of the real price of oil.
To obtain equations (2.42) and (2.41) see equations (A.31) and (A.32) in the appendix.
2.2.5 Monetary Policy
The central bank is assumed to implement monetary policy by choosing a level of the interest
rate in response to expectations of output and inflation, using the rule
it = α1Etyt+1 + α2Etpiq,t+1 + α3it−1 + α4it−2. (2.43)
The lagged interest rate values are included to account for the well-documented practice
of “interest rate smoothing” that has been found to be a standard practice of the Federal
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Reserve (Rebelo and Xie, 1999; Rudebusch, 2002). The values of the coefficients in (2.43)
are taken from the estimates in the careful empirical study of Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(2000). Specifically, the baseline monetary policy rule used in the simulations is
it = 0.93Etyt+1 + 2.15Etpiq,t+1 + 0.5it−1 + 0.29it−2.
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) did not report their estimates of α3 and α4, so we have
chosen values that sum to the 0.79 that they reported for the sum of coefficients on the
lagged interest rate terms.
In contrast, BG assumed an interest rate rule of the form
it = φpipiq,t.
A notable difference between that interest rate rule and the one that we use is that their
rule assumes the central bank does not attempt to stabilize output. Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (2000) found that the Federal Reserve assigns a large weight to the goal of output
stabilization, a point which matters in our simulations, for which one of our primary concerns
is the effect of oil shocks on output. Another difference is that the BG rule is not forward-
looking. The central bank waits until after the inflationary effects of an oil shock are realized
before acting to offset the inflation. Our interest rate rule allows the central bank to act to
prevent inflation from occurring. This is an important component of the recent literature
on monetary policy (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000).
2.2.6 Oil Price Dynamics
We follow BG in assuming that the price of oil follows the AR(1) process:
st = ρsst−1 + εt.
The error term is normally distributed with mean zero and variance equal to 0.16.
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2.2.7 Solution
Equations (2.17), (2.13), (2.15), (2.38), (2.41), and (2.42) describe the equilibrium dynamics
of prices and quantities, given exogenous processes for technology (at) and the real price of
oil (st). The following equations are solved to obtain the rational expectations equilibrium:
st = ρsst−1 + εs,t
piq,t = βEtpiq,t+1 + k1yt + λpΓw (wt − wt−1)
yt = Etyt+1 − [it − Etpiq,t+1] + k2st
it = α1Etyt+1 + α2Etpiq,t+1 + α3it−1 + α4it−2
k3Etyt+1 − k3yt − Etpiq,t+1 − k2st = ϕ1wt + ϕ2wt−1 + ϕ3Etwt+1
(2.44)
The system of equations (2.44) is solved using the generalized Schur method in R (R Core
Team, 2012). The solution takes the form of a vector autoregressive (VAR) model for s, piq,
y, w, and i.
The first step to find the equilibrium is to specify values of all the parameters. Table 1
describes the values and the sources of the calibrated parameters that appear in the model.
The parameters of the wage adjustment cost function are the estimates of Kim and Ruge-
Murcia (2009), the parameters of the monetary policy rule are the estimates of Clarida, Gali
and Gertler (2000), and all other parameters are those used by BG. The reason for taking
parameters from BG when possible is to allow for comparison of our simulation results with
those of BG.
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Table 2.1: Calibrated Values
Variable Value Source
β 0.99 Blanchard and Gali (2007)
θ 0.75 Blanchard and Gali (2007)
ψ 3844 Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009)
δ 280.4 Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009)
φ 1 Blanchard and Gali (2007)
ρs 0.97 Blanchard and Gali (2007)
χ 0.017 Blanchard and Gali (2007)
αn 0.7 Blanchard and Gali (2007)
αm 0.012 Blanchard and Gali (2007)
α1 0.93 Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000)
α2 2.15 Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000)
α3 0.5 Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000)
α4 0.29 Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000)
Mp 1.1 Blanchard and Gali (2007)
 11 Blanchard and Gali (2007)
σ 1.5
2.3 Can Wage Adjustment Costs Explain BG’s Re-
sults?
BG evaluated the importance of wage rigidities by simulating the variances of output and
inflation when γ = 0.9 and γ = 0.6. The case of completely inflexible wages is given by
γ = 1, so their baseline case assumes extreme wage rigidities. The choice of a baseline
case is not relevant for the simulations of our model because we are using an estimated
wage adjustment cost function. The estimates in Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) serve as our
baseline.
An accommodation needs to be made for the fact that our equilibrium, based on a log-
linearization of the first order conditions, may not be accurate once we move far away from
the steady state. We therefore compare the simulated variances of output and inflation
following a 5% increase in wage rigidity in BG’s model against a 5% increase in wage
adjustment costs in our model. To see the motivation for increasing both the wage stickiness
parameter and the wage adjustment cost by 5%, when they measure different things, our
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goal is to capture the difference in equilibrium when the wage is fully flexible and when
there are wage rigidities. We get the same information by moving the parameters of both
models 5% in the direction of fully flexible wages.
Table 2.2: Simulation Results
Variance ∆Variance (%)
Model
ψ = 3844
piq,t 1.741623e-08 -
yt 4.210282e-08 -
ψ = 3651.8
piq,t 1.741943e-08 0.018 %
yt 4.217797e-08 0.018 %
Model w/ BG
monetary rule
ψ = 3844
piq,t 2.85524e-07 -
yt 7.137252e-07 -
ψ = 3651.8
piq,t 2.855312e-07 0.003 %
yt 7.137429e-07 0.002 %
BG
γ = 0.855
piq,t 4.788527e-07 -
yt 0.0001820876 -
γ = 0.9
piq,t 6.081898e-07 27.010 %
yt 0.0002746878 50.855 %
Table 2.2 shows the simulated variances of output and inflation in the two models for
the experiments. Many significant digits need to be shown in the table because the changes
are so small with our model. The message that emerges is that, for all practical purposes, a
5% increase in wage adjustment costs has no effect on the variances of output and inflation
for our model and baseline parameterization. That is radically different from what we find
for BG’s model. A 5% rise in wage stickiness causes the variance of output to increase by
51%, and the variance of inflation increases by 27%. The results are the same for our model
when there is a change in δ, the other wage cost parameter, or when we use the estimated
quadratic adjustment cost function from Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009), so those results are
not reported.
We have also experimented with changes in the monetary policy function. BG demon-
strated that monetary policy had considerable effects on the variances of output and inflation
in their model. The monetary policy rule in our model is forward-looking and puts weight
on stabilization of both output and inflation. We replaced the monetary policy rule in
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our model with that of BG. The results can also be viewed in Table 2.2. There are slight
changes in the results, but they do not in any way change the conclusion that small changes
in wage adjustment costs have only trivial effects on the simulated variances. Changing the
coefficients on output or inflation in the policy rule does not change our conclusions either.
The last experiment we did was to change the persistence of the oil shock. There are
two ways that a wage adjustment cost can affect the response of wages to oil shocks. The
first is by causing firms to adjust wages smoothly in response to a shock, reflecting the fact
that the cost of adjusting the wage grows with the magnitude of the change in the wage.
The second is that it may be optimal to not change the wage at all, or change it only a
small amount, if oil shocks are short-lived. A short-lived increase in the price of oil would
require that the adjustment cost initially be paid to decrease the wage, and then when the
price of oil returns to its mean, a second adjustment cost be paid to raise the wage. The
importance of the second effect will depend on the persistence of oil shocks. Oil shocks are
extremely persistent for the BG parameterization (ρ = 0.97) and as such may make wage
adjustment costs irrelevant. Table 2.3 reports the results for a range of smaller values of ρ.
The message is the same, however. Moving 5% in the direction of fully flexible wages has
almost no effect on the variances of output and inflation.
Table 2.3: Change in Oil Shock Persistence
Variance ∆Variance (%)
ρ = 0.97
ψ = 3844
piq,t 1.741623e-08 -
yt 4.210282e-08 -
ψ = 3651.8
piq,t 1.741943e-08 0.018 %
yt 4.217797e-08 0.018 %
ρ = 0.5
ψ = 3844
piq,t 2.516347e-07 -
yt 2.537062e-07 -
ψ = 3651.8
piq,t 2.536986e-07 0.014 %
yt 2.516709e-07 0.003 %
ρ = 0.3
ψ = 3844
piq,t 2.146095e-07 -
yt 4.591836e-07 -
ψ = 3651.8
piq,t 2.14634e-07 0.013 %
yt 4.592465e-07 0.011 %
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These results make clear that one cannot interpret a change in the wage adjustment cost
as though it is the same as a change in wage stickiness. Small changes in wage adjustment
costs, at the point estimates of the wage adjustment cost function for the US, have very
little effect on the oil price-macroeconomy relationship. Figure 2.1 provides an explanation
for why this might be the case. It plots the variances of output and inflation for BG’s model
as the wage stickiness parameter changes. The simulated variances are very sensitive to a
change in wage stickiness when wages are very sticky, but at low levels of wage stickiness the
equilibrium is close to the fully flexible wage equilibrium, and it makes little difference if γ
changes. It is possible to get either a large or a small effect of wage stickiness depending on
which region of the graph one chooses to analyze. The simulation results discussed above
tell us that the estimates of Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) put us on the right side of the
graph.
Figure 2.1: Blanchard and Gali (2007) - Volatility and Changes in Wage Rigidity (γ)
2.4 Generating Large Effects of Wage Adjustment Costs
We have found that a model with empirically estimated wage adjustment costs imply that
wage stickiness has only a trivial effect on the oil price-macroeconomy relationship. This sec-
tion discusses the results from simulations using the estimated parameters of the quadratic
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special case (ψ = 0) of the wage adjustment cost function Φt from Kim and Ruge-Murcia
(2009). We report the ratio of the variances of output and inflation when the wage adjust-
ment cost parameter δ is multiplied by 1000.
We stress that we are not claiming that the US economy has experienced such an extreme
change in wage adjustment costs. Our goal is to provide information about the change in
wage adjustment costs that would be necessary to generate large effects on the variances in
output and inflation. It is our belief that it is extremely unlikely that the US has seen a
thousandfold change in wage adjustment costs.3 As above, we check the sensitivity of our
findings to changes in the monetary policy rule and the persistence of oil shocks.
The results are found in Table 2.4. For the baseline simulation, where all parameters
other than δ and ψ are set equal to the values reported in Table 1, the variance of inflation
increases by 135%. The variance of output rose 46%. This demonstrates that a model with
wage adjustment costs has no difficulty generating a large effect of wage stickiness on the
oil price-macroeconomy relationship, provided one increases the wage adjustment cost by a
sufficiently large amount.
3We are not aware of any published empirical papers that have found such large changes in wage ad-
justment costs in the US. Unfortunately, a literature review did not find any empirical papers that were
relevant to this question.
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Table 2.4: Changes in δ
Variance ∆Variance (%)
Model
δ = 1033.4
piq,t 2.0250e-09 -
yt 3.1684e-08 -
δ = 1033400
piq,t 4.7610e-09 135.11 %
yt 4.6225e-08 45.89 %
Model w/
α1 = 0.1
δ = 1033.4
piq,t 7.569e-09 -
yt 1.28881e-07 -
δ = 1033400
piq,t 1.4161e-08 87.09 %
yt 1.58404e-07 22.91 %
Model w/
α2 = 1.15
δ = 1033.4
piq,t 3.136e-09 -
yt 4.1616e-08 -
δ = 1033400
piq,t 4.9e-09 56.25 %
yt 5.3824e-08 29.33 %
Model w/
α1 = 0.1
α2 = 1.15
δ = 1033.4
piq,t 2.0164e-08 -
yt 2.6010e-07 -
δ = 1033400
piq,t 2.8224e-08 39.97 %
yt 3.31776e-07 27.56 %
Model w/ BG
monetary rule
δ = 1033.4
piq,t 3.32929e-07 -
yt 3.26041e-07 -
δ = 1033400
piq,t 3.721e-07 11.77 %
yt 5.65504e-07 73.45 %
Table 2.4 shows the simulation results when the parameters in the monetary policy rule
are changed to α1 = 0.1 and α2 = 1.15. This corresponds to the case where the Federal
Reserve puts little weight on output stabilization and the response to inflationary pressures
is barely strong enough to rule out sunspots. This change in monetary policy rule represents
a change from aggressively stabilizing output and inflation to an almost passive regime. The
results are consistent with our prior expectations that the monetary policy rule matters -
the variances of both output and inflation are much higher with the less aggressive policy
rule. The change in monetary policy nevertheless had little effect on the response to an
increase in delta. It is still necessary to multiply the adjustment cost by a very large value
to get the reduction in variances that BG found.
The final set of simulations demonstrate the effect of changes in persistence of the oil
shock. The reason the persistence of oil shocks matters was discussed in the previous section.
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We see that the parameter ρ is indeed a critical part of the story for the effects of wage
stickiness. Setting ρ = 0.3, and leaving all the other parameters at their baseline values, the
variance of inflation rises by 524% and the variance of output rises by 43%. The persistence
of the oil shock is very important to any story about wage stickiness and the effects of oil
shocks. The oil shock may simply be too persistent for wage adjustment costs to be relevant.
Table 2.5: Changes in Oil Shock Persistence
Variance ∆Variance (%)
ρ = 0.97
δ = 1033.4
piq,t 1.741623e-08 -
yt 4.210282e-08 -
δ = 1033400
piq,t 1.741943e-08 0.018 %
yt 4.217797e-08 0.018 %
ρ = 0.5
δ = 1033.4
piq,t 8.6436e-08 -
yt 8.5849e-06 -
δ = 1033400
piq,t 5.12656e-07 493.1 %
yt 1.239744e-05 44.41 %
ρ = 0.3
δ = 1033.4
piq,t 1.33225e-07 -
yt 1.56025e-05 -
δ = 1033400
piq,t 8.31744e-07 524.32 %
yt 2.225952e-05 42.67 %
2.5 Conclusion
This essay has evaluated the relevance of wage rigidities for understanding the effect of oil
price shocks on output and inflation. We took the theoretical framework of Blanchard and
Gali and modified it in two important ways. First, we add an empirically estimated wage
adjustment cost function as in Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009). Second, we introduce a real-
istic monetary policy function to be consistent with the current macroeconomic literature.
For a parametrization of the model that uses an empirically-estimated wage adjustment cost
function, the degree of wage stickiness has little effect on the oil price-macroeconomy rela-
tionship. Monetary policy is not an important factor with respect to the effect of changes
in wage stickiness on the effects of oil shocks on inflation and output. Large changes in the
variances of output and inflation require very large changes in wage adjustment costs.
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As pointed out by Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009), the other common way to model
wage stickiness is to assume Calvo-type staggered wage setting. That is worthy of future
investigation. Doing so will require specifying and estimating a complete model of the
economy, as we are unaware of any published papers that have estimated the parameters
of a Calvo specification in a DSGE model. Another avenue of future research is to use a
higher-order approximation, because log-linearization removes the asymmetry of the wage
adjustment cost function from our model.
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Chapter 3
Statistical Adequacy of Aggregate
Production Function and Growth
Econometric Models
3.1 Introduction
Colander (2008) argues that empirical modeling of macroeconomic processes in the United
States is dominated by a “theory comes first” paradigm. Spanos (2008) supports this view
that there is a “pre-eminence of theory” in empirical macroeconomic modeling and data serve
a subordinate role that helps to quantify theories that are already presumed accurate. Thus,
much of applied macro-econometric modeling in the literature does not fully test whether the
macro-econometric models are statistically adequate. That is, if the underlying statistical
assumptions of the estimated regression model being estimated are satisfied (e.g. Edwards,
Institute and University (2003)). Potential model misspecification may lead to biased and
inconsistent estimates, making any substantive inferences or policy recommendations based
on the model inappropriate (McGuirk, Driscoll and Alwang, 1993). Thus, to ensure that
inferences being made provide substantive validity, the applied macroeconomic modeler
must ensure that the underlying statistical assumptions of the model being estimated are
supported by the observed data, as the inference is dependent on the model’s statistical
validity or adequacy.
Many macroeconomic models for aggregate production function analysis are linear re-
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gression models, derived through appropriate transformations of the underlying theoretical
model (i.e. a log linearization, see Aschauer (1989a); Tatom (1991) for examples). Spanos
and McGuirk (2001) show that the testable assumptions of the linear regression model
include: normality of the underlying conditional distribution; linearity of the conditional
mean or regression function; homoskedasticity of the conditional variance; stability of the
parameters (homogeneity); and independence in the error term. A variety of misspecifica-
tion tests have been developed to test these assumptions individually and jointly (Spanos,
1999). While a number of studies have examined the influence of government capital in
aggregate production function models (Cassou and Lansing, 1998; Glomm and Ravikumar,
1997; Lynde and Richmond, 1992), many of these studies do not methodically check for
model misspecification beyond trend stationarity and unit roots. Even when examining
these models for potential trends and underlying unit roots in the data series (or cointe-
gration), model misspecification may skew the results (Andreou and Spanos, 2003). Thus,
it is imperative that the underlying statistical adequacy of the models being estimated be
determined before any substantive inference is made using the coefficient estimates from the
model.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the statistical adequacy of the Cobb-Douglass
aggregate production model with public capital as a factor of production and examine the
impact on substantive inference from statistical misspecification. More specifically, the pa-
per will (i) test the statistical adequacy of the models proposed by Aschauer (1989a) and
Tatom (1991) using a battery of misspecification tests for the time periods used by the
authors and a sample including more current events; (ii) if the models are misspecified,
then respecify the models to arrive at a statistically adequate model and assess the im-
pact on inferences made using the prior models; and (iii) examine the use of the student’s
t linear heteroskedastic regression model as a potential modeling alternative for capturing
heteroskedasticity. The debate about the role of public capital in aggregate production or
capital productivity is still undecided today. This paper will examine if model misspecifica-
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tion has potentially resulted in biased and/or inconsistent estimates and conclusions in the
applied macroeconomic literature on the subject by going back to the foundational papers.
3.2 Literature Review
The significance of public capital on macroeconomic variables (GDP in particular) has been
debated for several decades. In 1989, David Aschauer, while trying to explain what caused
the productivity slowdown in the US starting in the mid-1970s, examined the influence of
government capital on post WWII GDP in the United States. He found that ”...the decrease
in productive government services may be crucial in explaining the general decline in the
rate of growth of productivity which apparently arose in the early 1970s” (Aschauer (1989a),
p.179). In order to prove his case Aschauer (1989a) expanded on the Cobb-Douglas aggregate
production function literature by incorporating public capital as an additional variable. He
proposed an empirical model in log linearized form which is given by:
yt = α0 + α1t+ α2nt + α3gt + α4ut + εt, (3.1)
where
yt = ln (Yt)− ln (Kt),
nt = ln (Lt)− ln (Kt),
gt = ln (Gt)− ln (Kt),
ut = ln (Ut),
Yt is aggregate output (value added),
Lt is hours worked,
Kt is the stock of private capital,
Gt is the stock of non-military public capital, and
Ut is the utilization rate, which is included to capture the effects of business cycles (Aschauer,
1989a). The utilization rate measures what fraction of maximum production capacity is
utilized.
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Table 3.1 shows some of the regression results from Aschauer (1989a). The key finding
is that α3 is positive and significant, implying that a one percent increase in the public-to-
private capital ratio leads to an increase in the productivity of capital by 0.39 percent. This
is higher than the impact of the labor-capital ratio, which increases capital productivity
by 0.35 percent for every 1 percent increase in the labor-capital ratio. Aschauer’s findings
have significant policy implications, by advocating an increase in government spending on
infrastructure as a means to stimulate economic growth in the United States.
Table 3.1: Estimation Results with Public Capital (Aschauer, 1989a)
α0 α1 α2 α3 α4 R¯
2 S2
Aschauer (1949-1985) −2.42
(−21.58)
0.008
(4.62)
0.35
(4.85)
0.39
(16.23)
0.43
(12.28)
0.976 0.0078
Numerous authors have challenged Aschauer’s results. Researchers have used different
econometric models to support or challenge his findings: systems of simultaneous equations
and single equation models using both time series and panel data. Some researchers found
his results to be upwardly biased, but significant (Cassou and Ai, 1995; G. Duggal, Saltzman
and Klein, 1999). Others have found Aschauer’s results insignificant or significant but with
the wrong sign (Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz, 1995). In this paper, we chose to focus on
single equation time series models following Aschauer (1989a). Tatom (1991) challenged
Aschauer’s findings based on the following reasons: (i) omission of an energy series in the
aggregate production function, (ii) omission of significant nonlinear time trends and (iii) the
use of non-stationary variables in the regression.
The first change Tatom (1991) advocates is the addition of an energy series as a variable
in the Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function. He then makes an assumption that
the energy series can be represented by the ratio of output to a relative energy price series.
Unfortunately the author does not provide the source of the price of energy used in the
paper. Private sector energy use data is readily available, making it unclear why Tatom
makes such a strong assumption.
Tatom finds unit roots in the explanatory variables using Dickey-Fuller tests and accord-
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ingly takes the log-differences of the variables to estimate the following model:
∆ ln
(
Yt
Kt
)
= β0 + β1t+ β2∆ ln
(
Nt
Kt
)
+ β3∆ ln
(
Gt
Kt
)
+ β4∆ ln (p
e
t ) + t (3.2)
where pet is the price of energy relative to the price of business output. Estimation results
for this transformed model are provided below in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Estimation Results with Public Capital (Tatom, 1991)
β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 R¯
2 S2
Tatom (1949-1989) 0.025
(6.30)
−0.0005
(−3.05)
0.737
(14.34)
0.042
(0.33)
−0.058
(−3.23)
0.85 0.0015
Table 3.2 shows that public capital is positive, but statistically insignificant. The author
states that the log-difference of the model causes public capital to become insignificant and
the inclusion of the relative energy price series to be significant. Tatom (1991) estimates
equation (3.2) without energy and finds that public capital is insignificant, as well.
3.3 Data
For our analysis we use annual data for three time periods: (i)1949 to 1985; (ii)1949 to1989;
and (iii)1949 to 2009. The first two time periods provide coverage of the original time periods
examined by Aschauer (1989a) and Tatom (1991). We expand these time periods to include
more recent macroeconomic events up to 2009, expanding on the knowledge concerning the
processes underlying these models.
Output, private capital and public capital data were taken from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). Public capital excludes any military fixed assets. Hours worked were taken
from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). We used the hours worked by
full time and part time employees in the private sector. The utilization rate was taken
from the Board of Governors table G.17. Table 3.3 lists the specific tables the dataset was
compiled from. Please note that the data has undergone multiple revisions since Aschauer
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and Tatom published their papers. ”Since then, the data has been revised numerous times,
including changing the base period for computing constant-dollar output and capital stock
data” (Tatom (1991), p.6). It is unlikely we would be able to replicate the exact results of
Aschauer (1989a) and Tatom (1991). However, we do expect to get similiar results. Since
we have additional observations of data in our expanded dataset from 1949 to 2009, the
larger sample will provide a test of the robustness of their models over time.
Table 3.3: Data Sources
Series Source
Output BEA: Value Added by Industry (Release Date - Sep 30, 2010)
Hours NIPA: GDP: Table 6.9: Hours Worked by FT and PT Employees by Industry
Private Capital BEA: Fixed Assets Tables: Table 3.3ES:Stock of Private Fixed Assets by Industry
Public Capital BEA: Fixed Assets Tables: Table 7.2: Net Stock of Government Fixed Assets
Utilization Rate Board of Governors: Table G.17: Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization
Energy US Energy Information Administration: Energy Consumption by Sector
3.4 Initial Estimation
In this section we estimate both Aschauer’s (1989) and Tatom’s (1991) models for the
time periods both authors used in their papers and for the full sample of data collected.
Table 3.4 presents the original estimation results by Aschauer (1989a) and our estimation
for the subsample (1949-1985) and the full sample (1949-2009).
Table 3.4: OLS Estimation Results (Aschauer, 1989a)
α0 α1 α2 α3 α4 R¯
2 S2
Aschauer (1989) [1949-1985] −2.42
(−21.58)
0.008
(4.62)
0.35
(4.85)
0.39
(16.23)
0.43
(12.28)
0.976 0.0078
Estimated [1949-1985] −0.96
(−1.59)
0.01
(4.62)
0.39
(3.51)
0.27
(3.76)
0.38
(8.38)
0.9344 0.0001
Estimated [1949-2009] 0.06
(0.09)
0.01
(7.00)
0.50
(4.74)
0.24
(2.24)
0.23
(3.17)
0.9301 0.0005
Our estimates for the same period used by Aschauer show that private capital is positive
and significant. The difference is that we obtain a lower coefficient estimate than Aschauer.
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For the full sample, the estimate for α3 is marginally lower than for the partial sample esti-
mate. For all the models the coefficient on the public-to-private capital ratio is statistically
significant at the 5 percent level.
Next, Tatom’s model (Tatom, 1991) with the relative price of energy and log-differenced
variables given by equation (3.2) is estimated. Table 3.5 shows published estimates and
our results. For the model estimated here a variable representing energy used by the non-
residential private sector was included as a proxy for energy in the model (based on the
discussion in section 2). The estimation results indicate that labor productivity has a coef-
ficient larger than one and public capital has an insignificant impact on output productivity
for both time periods examined.
Table 3.5: OLS Estimation Results (Model 3.2)
β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 R¯
2 S2
Tatom (1991) [1949-1989] 0.025
(6.30)
−0.0005
(−3.05)
0.737
(14.34)
0.042
(0.33)
−0.058
(−3.23)
0.85 0.0015
Estimated [1949-1989] 0.04
(5.42)
−0.001
(−2.46)
1.21
(10.96)
−0.10
(−0.33)
0.24
(2.97)
0.7890 0.0002
Estimated [1949-2009] 0.02
(4.53)
−0.00
(−0.52)
0.99
(10.54)
0.18
(0.74)
0.17
(2.36)
0.6941 0.0002
The stark difference between Tatom’s results and ours can be attributed to data revisions
and to the fact that an alternative energy series was used as an input. We believe that Tatom
made several very strong assumptions: (i) he assumed that energy consumption is a linear
function (fraction of) output, and (ii) he imposed constant returns to scale (CRS) over labor,
public capital, private capital and energy without testing for it. While CRS has been tested
and proven to hold on the aggregate level for the first three factors of production (Cassou
and Ai, 1995), there has yet to be published evidence that CRS holds with energy included
in the aggregate production function. Furthermore, recall that Tatom did not explain how
he obtained his energy price series. As a result we are unable to directly replicate his
results. Thus, it was decided to utilize an energy series that is more reflective of the nature
of the aggregate production function and energy usage. In addition, Tatom assumes that
47
the relative price of energy is a constant proportion of the output series. Figure 3.1 plots
output and the energy series used in this paper. Visual examination of the plots would seem
to indicate that the relative energy series is not a constant proportion of output. The slopes
of the two series are not a constant proportion to each other over time, and substantially
deviate from each other after the oil price shocks and macroeconomic policies of the 1970s.
Figure 3.1: Plots of Output and Energy Series (1949-2009)
3.5 Testing for Statistical Adequacy
This section we will describe the tests used for misspecification testing and the results of
the battery of tests for both Aschauer’s (1989) and Tatom’s (1991) models.
3.5.1 Misspecification Tests
Following Spanos (1986) the normal linear regression model has 5 testable assumptions:
1. Distributional: Normality of the underlying conditional distribution(f (yt|nt, kt, ut))
and error distribution (f (εt))
2. Functional Form: Linearity of the conditional mean or regression function
(E [yt|nt, kt, ut] = α0 + α2nt + α3gt + α4ut)
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3. Homoskedasticity: The conditional variance does not vary over time and is not a
function of the regressors (V ar [yt|nt, kt, ut] = V ar (εt) = σ2)
4. Homogeneity: The parameters of the model are stable over time (α is not a function
of t)
5. Independence: The stochastic process {yt|nt, kt, ut, t  T} is independent over t.
Based on these assumptions, a number of misspecification tests have been developed to test
if these assumptions are satisfied by the observed data. These tests and the assumptions
they address are outlined below.
• Bera-Jarque normality test (Jarque and Bera, 1981) is a parametric normality test
assessing if the data series has a skewness of zero and kurtosis of three.
• D’Agostino-Pearson skewness test (D’Agostino and Stephens, 1986) tests the
null hypothesis that the data series has a skewness of zero. This is a parametric
distributional test.
• D’Agostino-Pearson Kurtosis test (D’Agostino and Stephens, 1986) tests the null
hypothesis that the data series has an excess kurtosis of zero. This is a parametric
distributional test.
• Ramsey RESET test (Ramsey, 1969) assesses the functional form of the model to
assess if the conditional mean is non-linear. This test is performed by adding squared
and cubic fitted residuals as additional covariates and testing their significance using
a Wald test.
• Homogeneity tests are performed to check for the presence of non-linear trends and
structural breaks. These tests are based on auxiliary regression tests following Spanos
(1986). To conduct theses tests, quadratic and cubic trends are added as additional
covariates and Wald tests are performed to see if the non-linear trends are significant.
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• Independence tests are conducted to test for serial correlation in the error term.
To perform the test, lagged values of the fitted residuals are included as additional
regressors in an auxiliary regression with the fitted residuals as the dependent variable
following Spanos (1986). A Wald test is used to assess if the lagged residuals are
significant.
• Joint Conditional Mean test is performed following McGuirk, Driscoll and Alwang
(1993) and allows the modeler to test jointly for linearity, homogeneity and indepen-
dence. This test provides a robust check of the individual tests as it allows the modeler
to test each individual assumption in the framework while relaxing the other assump-
tions. This may be important as heterogeneity may be masked as dependence and
vice versa. The joint test gives us greater confidence in the individual test results and
can help to isolate the true departure(s) when multiple assumptions fail. The joint
testing framework uses an auxiliary regression approach by incorporating non-linear
trends, lags of the fitted residuals and RESET terms.
• Breusch-Pagan test (Breusch and Pagan, 1979) tests for heteroskedasticity. This
test assesses if the variance from the linear regression is independent of the values of
the regressors. The test is performed by regressing the squares of the residuals on the
original independent variables. If the coefficients are significant, the null hypothesis
of homoskedasticity can be rejected.
• Augmented Dickey Fuller test (Greene, 2002) is an augmented version of the
Dickey-Fuller test and allows one to test for higher order unit root processes. This is
incorporated to assess if the underlying data series contain unit roots.
3.5.2 Statistical Adequacy of Aschauer’ Model
First, the variables used by Aschauer (1989a) are tested for the presence of unit roots.
Table 3.6 shows the results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests performed on
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the variables in equation (3.1). Given that Augmented Dickey Fuller (hereafter ADF) tests
have a relatively low power, if any of the three versions of ADF tests (random walk, random
walk with drift, and random walk with drift and trend) cannot reject the presence of unit
root process, then the variable is assumed to be non-stationary and has to be dealt with
accordingly.
Table 3.6: Augmented Dickey Fuller Unit Root Test Results for Aschauer Model
1948 - 1985 1948 - 2009
Unit Root Unit Root
yt Yes Yes
nt Yes Yes
gt Yes Yes
ut No No
εt No Yes
It is important to notice that for the sample size used by Aschauer three variables are non-
stationary, but the residuals are stationary. On the other hand when testing the variables
over the entire sample we observe that the only stationary variable is the utilization rate.
Thus, for the full sample it would seem that first differencing may be in order, but recall
that these tests may be biased if the model is not correctly specified. This will be further
explored in the next section of the paper.
Table 3.7 shows the results of misspecification tests preformed on equation 3.1 for the
period of 1948-1985. The model fails the normality, independence and homogeneity tests.
The sample kurtosis of the fitted residuals is 1.95, which is significantly lower than 3. The
homogeneity test results provide evidence that non-linear time trends should be included
in the model. In addition, the independence tests provide evidence of the presence of serial
autocorrelation. However, the joint conditional mean tests show that the model in its current
form suffers only from trend homogeneity.
Next we we run the same battery of tests over the entire sample of data. Table 3.8 shows
that we fail homogeneity, independence, homoskedasticity and the joint conditional mean
51
Table 3.7: Misspecification Tests (Aschauer, 1948 - 1985)
Test Statistic P-Value
Normality
Bera-Jarque Normality test 1.6634 0.435
D-Agostino-Pearson Normality test 4.0274 0.133
D-Agostino-Pearson Skewness test 0.0418 0.967
D-Agostino-Pearson Kurtosis test -2.01 0.0448
Skewness 0.0148
Kurtosis 1.95
Linearity
Ramsey RESET - Quadratic 0.0000 0.9934
Ramsey RESET - Cubic 0.0441 0.957
Homogeneity
Second Order 15.1146 0.0005
Third Order 6.3542 0.0173
Independence
One Period Lag 6.9251 0.0137
Two Period Lag 3.7686 0.036
Homoskedasticity
Breusch-Pagan 3.0480 0.5498
White Test 0.1149
Joint Conditional Mean
Homogeneity 6.6370 0.0053
Linearity 0.4602 0.8030
Independence 0.2749 0.7621
Overall 4.1295 0.0059
tests. For the larger sample, the joint conditional mean test points to serial autocorrelation
as the problem in the regression function and the individual homogeneity tests are failing
due to this. Thus Aschauer’s model in its current form is statistically misspecified for both
time periods.
3.5.3 Statistical Adequacy of Tatom’s Model
As it was mentioned earlier, Tatom (1991) log-differenced the variables used by Aschauer
based on unit root test results and added a relative price of energy as a proxy for energy.
Given that we are unable to obtain the original energy price series, a direct energy series is
used instead (as described earlier). Tatom’s model is tested for statistical adequacy using
the same battery of tests.
Table 3.9 shows that the model passes all the tests conducted. Table 3.10 presents
the results of the ADF tests performed on the variables used in Tatom’s regressions. The
table presents test results for the variables in levels and in log-differences. Tatom used log-
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Table 3.8: Misspecification Tests (Aschauer, 1948 - 2009)
Test Statistic P-Value
Normality
Bera-Jarque Normality test 1.474 0.479
D-Agostino-Pearson Normality test 1.9211 0.383
D-Agostino-Pearson Skewness test -0.647 0.518
D-Agostino-Pearson Kurtosis test -1.23 0.22
Skewness -0.186
Kurtosis 2.34
Linearity
Ramsey RESET - Quadratic 0.2281 0.6348
Ramsey RESET - Cubic 1.4919 0.2341
Homogeneity
Second Order 48.7747 0.0000
Third Order 24.0730 0.0000
Independence
One Period Lag 197.38 0.0000
Two Period Lag 98.83 0.0000
Homoskedasticity
Breusch-Pagan 12.4116 0.0145
White Test 0.0001
Joint Conditional Mean
Homogeneity 0.2501 0.7797
Linearity 0.3911 0.6784
Independence 34.7451 0.0000
Overall 30.7888 0.0000
Table 3.9: Misspecification Tests (Tatom, 1949 - 1989)
Test Statistic P-Value
Normality
Bera-Jarque Normality test 0.3179 0.853
D-Agostino-Pearson Normality test 0.1843 0.912
D-Agostino-Pearson Skewness test -0.415 0.678
D-Agostino-Pearson Kurtosis test -0.11 0.912
Skewness -0.142
Kurtosis 2.67
Linearity
Ramsey RESET - Quadratic 0.0013 0.9711
Ramsey RESET - Cubic 0.4049 0.6703
Homogeneity
Second Order 0.00185 0.8926
Third Order 0.0181 0.8938
Independence
One Period Lag 2.0414 0.1628
Two Period Lag 1.0053 0.3776
Homoskedasticity
Breusch-Pagan 5.5193 0.2380
White Test 0.3395
Joint Conditional Mean
Homogeneity 0.1845 0.8325
Linearity 0.0533 0.9482
Independence 0.9821 0.3875
Overall 0.3795 0.8856
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differenced variables in his analysis. However, the log-differenced gt is non-stationary, while
every other variable including the residuals are stationary. Thus, the underlying model is
misspecified with respect to the transformations taken to correct for unit roots in the log-
differenced gt data series. While Tatom’s model is much closer to being properly specified
from a statistical viewpoint, the results do not provide much empirical meaning.
Table 3.10: Augmented Dickey Fuller Unit Root Test Results for Tatom’s Model
Log-Differenced Variables Variables in Levels
1948 - 1989 1948 - 2009 1948 - 1989 1948 - 2009
Unit Root Unit Root Unit Root Unit Root
yt No No Yes Yes
nt No No Yes Yes
gt Yes Yes Yes Yes
(en)t No No Yes Yes
εt No No No No
Next we test Tatom’s model over the entire sample. The results are presented in ta-
ble 3.11. For the full sample, the model fails homogeneity and one of the homoskedasticity
tests. Thus, for the entire sample the model is not statistically adequate. It is of interest
that Tatom tests for a nonlinear trend in the nondifferenced model and finds both a trend
and squared trend are statistically significant. In addition, the public-to-private capital
ratio is statistically significant in that model, as well.
3.6 Model Respecification
Test results in section 3.5.3 show that in Tatom’s (1991) model one of the log-differenced
variables remains non-stationary, and in its current form, the model is misspecified. Fur-
thermore, further log-differencing the variables to achieve stationarity would likely lead to
nonsensical results theoretically. As a result, we will begin by considering Aschauer’s (1989)
specification.
Andreou and Spanos (2003) suggest correcting for deterministic heterogeneity in a data
series before testing for a unit root, as the results may be biased otherwise. Deterministic
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Table 3.11: Misspecification Tests (Tatom, 1949 - 2009)
Test Statistic P-Value
Normality
Bera-Jarque Normality test 1.2025 0.548
D-Agostino-Pearson Normality test 1.8979 0.387
D-Agostino-Pearson Skewness test 0.205 0.837
D-Agostino-Pearson Kurtosis test 1.36 0.173
Skewness 0.0586
Kurtosis 3.68
Linearity
Ramsey RESET - Quadratic 1.1734 0.2834
Ramsey RESET - Cubic 0.7332 0.4851
Homogeneity
Second Order 5.3248 0.0248
Third Order 5.3066 0.0250
Independence
One Period Lag 0.0000 0.9987
Two Period Lag 1.7637 0.1815
Homoskedasticity
Breusch-Pagan 8.7502 0.0677
White Test 0.6178
Joint Conditional Mean
Homogeneity 0.5768 0.5656
Linearity 0.1903 0.8274
Independence 1.0274 0.3657
Overall 0.8360 0.5483
heterogeneity can result from trends, structural breaks, or a combination/interaction of both.
Thus, we first examine structural breaks in the data series. We tested for structural breaks
over time by examining the significance of time dummies for each year in the dataset. It was
found that, structural breaks should be modeled for the following two periods of time: (i)
1969-1985 and (ii) 1992-2004. Next we estimate the following regression for the dependent
and each explanatory variable.
Zt = δ0 + δ1D69 + δ2D92 + δ3t+ δ4D69t+ δ5D92t+ δ6t
2 + δ7t
3 + ωt (3.3)
where D69 and D92 are dummy variables equal to 1 for the two time periods indicated above.
We added quadratic and cubic trends to capture higher order trends. Interactions between
the time dummies and linear time trend where the only significant interactions found after
testing each data series for higher order interactions. We then used the detrended mean
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deviation form (using ωt) of the variables (n˜t, g˜t, u˜t) to test for unit roots. We found that
there are no unit roots processes in the data series. These results contrast with Tatom’s
(1991) results and further supports the use of Aschauer’s model specification.
Given that we have already corrected for deterministic heterogeneity in the data, we run
the following regression using the detrended mean deviation data series:
y˜t = γ1n˜t + γ2g˜t + γ3u˜t + ηt (3.4)
Table 3.12: Model (3.4) Estimation Results
γ1 γ2 γ3 R¯
2 S2
Estimated (1949 - 2009) 0.26
(2.79)
0.30
(3.90)
0.42
(9.19)
0.8476 0.0001
Table 3.12 shows that all variables are significant at the 5 percent level. Before making
further inference, we test for statistical adequacy of the model by running the same set of
misspecification tests on model (3.4) as in the previous section. Table 3.13 shows that the
model fails the independence test. This implies that there is potential serial autocorrelation
in the error term. We do not test for homogeneity because the data has already been
detrended
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Table 3.13: Model (3.4) Misspecification Tests
Test Statistic P-Value
Normality
Bera-Jarque Normality test 1.3782 0.502
D-Agostino-Pearson Normality test 1.5798 0.454
D-Agostino-Pearson Skewness test -1.24 0.213
D-Agostino-Pearson Kurtosis test 0.175 0.861
Skewness -0.364
Kurtosis 2.88
Linearity
Ramsey RESET - Quadratic 0.3547 0.5538
Ramsey RESET - Cubic 1.0694 0.3501
Independence
One Period Lag 6.6868 0.0124
Two Period Lag 3.5350 0.0361
Homoskedasticity
Breusch-Pagan 0.4324 0.8056
White Test 0.8715
Joint Conditional Mean
Linearity 1.0733 0.3493
Independence 3.2580 0.0153
Overall 2.3090 0.0368
We correct for serial autocorrelation by modeling the error as [ηt = ρηt−1 + vt]. Following
Greene (2002), we estimate the above regression model with the detrended mean deviation
form of the variables and the serially autocorrelated error using the method of maximum
likelihood. The regression takes the following form
y˜t = γ1n˜t + γ2g˜t + γ3u˜t + ηt, ηt = ρηt−1 + vt. (3.5)
Results are provided in Table 3.14.
Table 3.14: Model (3.5) Estimation Results
γ1 γ2 γ3 ρ R¯
2 S2
Estimated (1949 - 2009) 0.24
(2.26)
0.30
(3.19)
0.41
(8.30)
0.32
(2.56)
0.8246 0.0001
Again, all of the coefficient estimates and ρ are statistically significant at the 5 percent
level, indicating the presence of first order serial autocorrelation. However, this model is
a restricted form of the dynamic linear regression model as presented by Spanos (1986)
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that explicitly incorporates lags of the dependent and explanatory variables directly into
the regression model. Thus, the serially autocorrelated model is nested within the dynamic
linear regression model via a set of nonlinear restrictions known as common factors (Greene,
2002). A Lagrange Multiplier test was used to test if the observed data provides support
for the common factor restrictions. A test statistic of 2.6683 with p-value equal to 0.6148
was obtained, indicating strong support for the common factor restrictions and serially
autocorrelated correction undertaken. Given the new specification, the misspecification
tests are re-ran to test the statistical adequacy of the new serially autocorrelated model.
Results of the tests are provided in Table 3.15 .
Table 3.15: Model (3.5) Misspecification Tests
Test Statistic P-Value
Normality
Bera-Jarque Normality test 1.3028 0.521
D-Agostino-Pearson Normality test 1.9321 0.381
D-Agostino-Pearson Skewness test -1.17 0.242
D-Agostino-Pearson Kurtosis test 0.75 0.453
Skewness -0.341
Kurtosis 3.22
Linearity
Ramsey RESET - Quadratic 1.3640 0.2478
Ramsey RESET - Cubic 0.9997 0.3746
Independence
One Period Lag 0.1319 0.7179
Two Period Lag 0.0854 0.9183
Homoskedasticity
Breusch-Pagan 0.4323 0.8056
White Test 0.8715
Joint Conditional Mean
Linearity 1.0450 0.3587
Independence 0.2498 0.6192
Overall 0.7407 0.5325
This time the battery of misspecification tests conducted indicates that the underlying
assumptions of the regression model specified are supported by the observed data. That is,
a statistically adequate model has been obtained and it shows that public capital is highly
significant. A one percent increase in the public-to-private capital ratio will increase output
productivity by 0.30 percent. This number is less than the 0.39 estimated by Aschauer,
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however it is statistically significant.
3.7 Student’s t Linear Heteroskedastic Regression Model
It may be of interest to examine other distributional assumptions for completeness and as
an extension to the above framework. Other distributions in the symmetric elliptical family,
of which the normal distribution is a member, can provide similar shapes as the normal
distribution, but have conditional variances that are heteroskedastic. One of particular
interest is the Student’s t regression model, which has a linear conditional mean, which
would be specified similarly to the respecified regression model for the Aschauer model
given by equation (3.4). The conditional variance would take the form:
V ar(yt|Xt = xt) =
(
v
v + k − 2
)
× σ2
(
1 +
[
1
v
(Xt − µt)′Σ−122 (Xt − µt)
])
(3.6)
where v is the degrees of freedom for the conditional Student’s t distribution, k is the
number of regressors, σ2 is a shape parameter, Xt is the vector of explanatory variables,
µt is the mean vector of the explanatory variables, and Σ22 is the covariance matrix of the
explanatory variables Spanos (1999).
The model is estimated using the method of maximum likelihood and the likelihood func-
tion must include the multivariate distribution of the explanatory variables, given the param-
eters of the conditional distribution being estimated are not weakly exogenous with respect
to the parameters of the multivariate distribution of the explanatory variables (see Spanos
(1999); i.e. hence the inclusion of the parameters µt and Σ22 in the conditional variance).
Following Spanos (1999), we take the mean deviation form of the variables so that µt = 0 in
the model, making the intercept α0 in the conditional mean function equal to 0. Further-
more, we remove trends and structural breaks when taking the mean deviation form. This
is done by estimating the regression: Zt = δ0 +δ1D69 +δ2D92 +δ3t+δ4D69t+δ5D92t+δ6t
2 +
δ7t
3 + ωt, and using ωt as the detrended mean deviation form of the variables. This trans-
formation corrects for any heterogeneity in the data prior to model estimation. In addition,
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during estimation v is set to a known value. We examine different values of v up to 10 and
find that v = 8 provides the maximum log-likelihood value. In addition, examination of a
quantile-quantile plot provides evidence that v = 8 provides the best fit. The model was
estimated using the procedures outlined in Spanos (1999) in MATLAB.
The estimated model is given below with asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses.
Conditional Mean Function:
y˜t = 0.27
(2.51)
n˜t + 0.29
(3.26)
k˜t + 0.43
(8.24)
u˜t + ηt
Conditional Variance Function:
0.0000012
(182.77)
(
1 + 0.25
[
0.00061
(9.76)
− 0.00017
(−2.56)
ntkt + 0.00087
(5.29)
ntut + 0.00050
(5.85)
k2t + 0.00011
(0.81)
ktut + 0.0024
(9.31)
u2t
])
with a log-likelihood value of 442.77. The coefficient estimates for the conditional mean are
very similar to the those in the respecified Aschauer model, but there the conditional variance
is assumed to be homoskedastic. The regression results here would seem to indicate that
this assumption may not be adequate enough and that a heteroskedastic model, as the one
estimated above is possibly more appropriate. In addition, the conditional variance provides
additional information about the variability of capital productivity as a function of labor,
public capital and the utilization rate. For example, if the public to private capital ratio is
increased by one unit, then the conditional variance will change by ∂V ar(yt|nt, kt, ut)/∂kt =
0.000000076k−0.0000000055n+0.000000000025u < 0 within the range of the observed data
used to estimate the model. The implications from this model for macroeconomic theory
and policy need to be explored further and are beyond the scope of this paper. In addition,
the model would need to be expanded to incorporate potential dynamics.
3.8 Conclusion
In this paper we assess the statistical adequacy of the Cobb-Douglas aggregate produc-
tion function as specified in Aschauer (1989) and Tatom (1991); and examine the impact
on substantive inference from statistical misspecification. We test the statistical adequacy
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of the models proposed by Aschauer and Tatom and find that both models are misspeci-
fied. Aschauer’s model fails to satisfy the underlying assumptions of the linear regression
model. Tatom’s model suffers from the same criticism he levies against Aschauer’s model,
non-stationarity in the data series used to estimate the model. Tatom, who used first dif-
ferencing to achieve stationary variables, still has variables that remain nonstationary after
first differencing. It is found that the unit root testing in Tatom’s paper may be misleading,
given any deterministic heterogeneity not taken into account prior to testing may bias unit
root testing results.
To correct for potential misspecification of the model we detrend the variables used and
utilize the mean deviation form of the variables to test for unit roots. To detrend we regress
each variable on the linear and non-linear time trends plus the interaction of linear time
trend with dummy variables. Dummy variables are included to capture structural breaks
in the data. Unit root testing results find that the data actually support the assumption of
trend stationarity over a unit root. Thus, Aschauer’s specification of the model is utilzied
for the remainder of the paper. To correct for serial autorcorrelation, an AR(1) error process
is assumed and common factor restrictions are tested for, which are both supported by the
data. The final model is fully tested and passes the full battery of misspecification tests.
The final statistically adequate model shows that public capital is statistically significant
with a coefficient of 0.3, which is lower then Aschauer’s estimate of 0.39.
For a robustness check, we decide to further explore the assumption of homoskedatic-
ity by estimating a Student’s t linear heteroskedastic model where the conditional variance
is heteroskedastic. Once again we find estimates similar to those from the homoskedastic
model, but the terms in the conditional variance are found to be significant, pointing to-
ward potential heteroskedasticity. In general we can confirm Aschauer’s results that public
capital is an important input in the aggregate production function. Our results also refute
a large body of literature that discredits Aschauer’s findings claiming that his model is
statistically misspecified. We can confirm that his model was misspecified but the general
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results Aschauer obtained are valid. Future research will further explore the statistical ad-
equacy of macroeconomic models using Cobb-Douglas aggregate production functions; and
the implications of using a linear heteroskedastic regression model as an empirical modeling
framework.
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Appendix A
Model Derivation - Essay 2
A.1 Households
max E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ln (Ct)− N
1+φ
t
1 + φ
)
s.t
(i) Pq,tCq,t + Pm,tCm,t +Q
B
t = WtNt (1− Φt) +Bt−1 + Πt
where Cq,t is a CES index of domestic goods; Cm,t is the consumption of (imported) oil;
Pq,t is a price index of domestically produced goods; Pm,t is the price of oil (in domestic
currency); Bt is the quantity of risk-free domestic bonds purchased in period t; Q
B
t is the
price of that bond; Wt is the nominal wage;
(ii) Φt =
(
δ
ψ2
)[
e
−ψ
(
σWt
Wt−1−1
)
+ ψ
(
Wt
Wt−1
− 1
)
− 1
]
Φt is the wage adjustment cost, where σ and ψ are the asymmetric wage rigidity param-
eters.
(iii) Ct = ΘχC
χ
m,tC
1−χ
q,t
(iv) Cq,t =
[∫ 1
0
Cq,t(i)di
−1

] 
−1
(v) Θχ = χ
−χ(1− χ)−(1−χ)
(vi) Pq,t =
[∫ 1
0
Pq,t(i)di
1−
] 1
1−
(vii) Pc,t = P
χ
m,tP
1−χ
q,t
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A.1.1 FOCs
∂L
∂Nt
: Nφt = λtWt (1− Φt) (A.1)
∂L
∂Cq,t
: (1− χ) = λtPq,tCq,t (A.2)
∂L
∂Cm,t
: χ = λtPm,tCm,t (A.3)
∂L
∂Bt
: QBt = β(
λt+1
λt
) (A.4)
∂L
∂Wt
: λtNt
{[
σψ
(
Wt
Wt−1
)
− 1
]
e
−ψ
(
σWt
Wt−1−1
)
− 2ψ
(
Wt
Wt−1
)
+ ψ
(
1 +
ψ
δ
)
+ 1
}
=
= βλt+1Nt+1
(
ψ
W 2t
){
σe
−ψ
(
σWt
Wt−1−1
)
− 1
}
(A.5)
Divide (A.2) by (A.3) we get the following:
(1− χ)Pm,tCm,t = χPq,tCq,t (A.6)
Pm,tCm,t = χPc,tCt (A.7)
Pq,tCq,t = (1− χ)Pc,tCt (A.8)
Note, plug (A.7) and (A.8) into (A.6) to check that (A.7) and (A.8) hold.
From (A.3) solve for λt and plug it into (A.4) to get Q
B
t = β(
Pm,tCm,t
Pm,t+1Cm,t+1
).
Now plug (A.7) and (A.8) to get the following:
QBt = βEt
(
Ct
Ct+1
Pc,t
Pc,t+1
)
(A.9)
Pc,t = P
χ
m,tP
1−χ
q,t = Pq,tS
χ
t
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where
{
St =
Pm,t
Pq,t
}
is the real price of oil expressed in the domestic goods
Log-linearizing
pc,t = pq,t + χst (A.10)
Marginal rate of substitution between Nt and Ct is
(−1)
∂L
∂Nt
∂L
∂Ct
= (−1)
[
Nφt − λtWt (1− Φt)
1
Ct
]
= MRSC,N
Plug
{
λt =
χ
Pm,tCm,t
}
and {Pm,tCm,t = χPc,tCt} into {MRSC,N = 1} to get the following
labor supply condition under perfect competition
Nφt Ct =
Wt (1− Φt)
Pc,t
(A.11)
Log-linearizing equation (A.11)
[
1 +
ϕΦ
1− Φ
]
wt − pc,t = ct + φnt +
(
ϕΦ
1− Φ
)
wt−1 (A.12)
where ϕ =
ψ[σe−ψ(σ−1)−1]
[e−ψ(σ−1)−1] and Φ =
(
δ
ψ2
) [
e−ψ(σ−1) − 1]. Equation (A.12) shows the rela-
tionship between wage in period t and consumption, consumer price level, and employment
in period t as well as the wage in the previous period.
Log-linearizing equation (A.9)
ct = Etct+1 − [it − Etpic,t+1] (A.13)
where
QBt
QB
− 1 = −it and Etpic,t+1 = pc,t+1 − pc,t
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A.2 Firms
A.2.1 Intermediate goods firm
Each firm produces a differentiated good indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] using the following production
function
Qt(i) = AtMt(i)
αmNt(i)
αn (A.14)
where Mt and Nt are the quantities of imported oil and labor used in production. Using
the assumption that firms take input prices as given, firm’s problem becomes:
min WtNt(i) + Pm,tMt(i) + λ
f
t [AtMt(i)
αmNt(i)
αn −Qt(i)]
FOCs
Nt(i) : Wt = λ
f
t (αn)
[
Qt(i)
Nt(i)
]
(A.15)
Mt(i) : Pm,t = λ
f
t (αm)
[
Qt(i)
Mt(i)
]
(A.16)
λft : Qt(i) = AtMt(i)
αmNt(i)
αn (A.17)
λft is the marginal cost. Following the approach by Blanchard and Gali redefine marginal
cost as
Ψt(i) =
Wt
αn
[
Qt(i)
Nt(i)
] = Pm,t
αm
[
Qt(i)
Mt(i)
] (A.18)
Letting
{
Mpt (i) =
Pq,t(i)
Ψt(i)
}
denote a gross markup by firm i, we have
MPt (i)× St ×Mt(i) = αmQt(i)
[
Pq,t(i)
Pq,t
]
(A.19)
In order to show that (A.19) holds, plug
{
St =
Pm,t
Pq,t
}
,
{
Mpt (i) =
Pq,t(i)
Ψt(i)
}
and
{
Ψt(i) =
Pm,t
αm[
Qt(i)
Mt(i)
]
}
into the left hand side of that equation to get
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Qt =
[∫ 1
0
Qt(i)
1− 1
 di
] 
−1
(A.20)
A.2.2 Final goods firm
Let aggregate gross output be given by the following formula
Qt =
[∫ 1
0
Qt(i)
1− 1
 di
] 
−1
(A.21)
The final goods firm
max
Qt(i)
Pq,tQt −
∫ 1
0
Pq,t(j)Qt(j)dj
Plug (A.21) to get
max Pq,t
[∫ 1
0
Qt(i)
1− 1
 di
] 
−1
−
∫ 1
0
Pq,t(j)Qt(j)dj (A.22)
FOCs
Qt(i) =
(
Pq,t(i)
Pq,t
)−
(A.23)
plug (A.23) into (A.19)
[∫ 1
0
Mt(i)di
] [∫ 1
0
Mpt (j)dj
]
=
αmQt
St
Let Mt =
[∫ 1
0
Mt(i)di
]
and Mpt =
[∫ 1
0
Mpt (j)dj
]
, we can re-write the above equation as
Mt =
αmQt
StM
p
t
(A.24)
Log-linearizing equation (A.24)
mt = −µpt − st + qt (A.25)
where µpt = log(M
p
t )
74
Log-linearizing equation (A.21)
qt = at + αmmt + αnnt (A.26)
Plug (A.25) into (A.26) to get reduced gross output production function:
qt =
(
1
1− αm
)
[at + αnnt − αmµpt − αmst] (A.27)
A.3 Consumption and Gross Output
Note that in an equilibrium with the balanced trade (and hence Bt = 0) the following
relation must hold
Pc,tCt = Pq,tQt + Pm,tMt
Plug (A.24) to get
Pc,tCt =
(
1− αm
Mpt
)
Pq,tQt
Plug {Pc,t = Pq,tSχt }to get
Sχt Ct =
(
1− αm
Mpt
)
Qt
Log-linearizing the equation above we have
ct = qt − χst + ηµpt (A.28)
where η = αm
Mp−αm .
Plugging (A.28) into (A.27) and using the fact
(
αm
Mp−αm − αm1−αm
)
µpt ' 01 we get
ct =
at
1− αm +
(
αm
1− αm
)
nt −
(
αm
1− αm + χ
)
st (A.29)
1See Blanchard and Gali (2007) p.69
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A.4 Gross Output, Value Added, and the GDP defla-
tor
Pq,t = (Py,t)
1−αm (Pm,t)
αm
where Py,t is the GDP deflator.
Log-linearize and rearrange terms
py,t =
(
1
1− αm
)
pq,t −
(
αm
1− αm
)
pm,t
Plug {st = pm,t − pq,t} to get the formula for the GDP deflator
py,t = pq,t −
(
αm
1− αm
)
st (A.30)
Value added Yt is defined by
Py,tYt = Pq,tQt − Pm,tMt =
(
1− αm
Mpt
)
Pq,tQt
Log-linearizing
py,t = ηµ
p
t + pq,t + qt − yt
Plug (A.30)
yt = qt + ηµ
p
t + pq,t − pq,t +
(
αm
1− αm
)
st
Plug (A.27)
yt =
(
1
1− αm
)
[at + αnnt] (A.31)
Plug (A.31) into (A.29) to get the relationship between consumption and value added
ct = yt −
(
αm
1− αm + χ
)
st (A.32)
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A.5 Price Setting
The firms set prices in a staggered fashion2. The optimal rule for price setting is
Et
{
k∞∑
k=0
ΘkΛt,t+kQt,t+k|t
[
P ∗t −MPΨt+k|t
]}
= 0 (A.33)
where
P ∗t is the new price set at time t
Qt,t+k is the level of output in period (t+ k) for a firm that last set price in period t
Ψt+k|t is the marginal cost in period (t+ k) for a firm that last set price in period t
Mp = 
−1 desired gross markup (in steady state)
Domestic price evolution equation is given by
Pq,t =
[
θ(Pq,t−1)1− + (1− θ) (P ∗t )1−
] 1
1− (A.34)
Log-linearizing (A.33) and (A.34) and rearranging terms
piq,t = βEt {piq,t+1} − λpµˆpt (A.35)
where
µˆpt = µ
p
t − µp; λp =
[
(1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ
] [
αm+αn
1+(1−αm−αn)(−1)
]
and piq,t = pq,t − pq,t−1
2See Calvo (1983)
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